


JPRS-NEA-94-040

29 July 1994



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

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Near East & South Asia

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ALGERIA

France Questions 'FIS' Members; Weapons Reported

94AF0232C *Algiers EL WATAN in French 4 Jul 94 p 3*

[Unattributed article: "France: Two Ex-FIS Sympathizers Imprisoned"]

[Text] Last Saturday, two men presumed to be sympathizers of the Islamic Salvation Front (the banned FIS) became the subject of an investigation for infraction of the laws on arms and ammunition and conspiracy to break the law in connection with a terrorist undertaking, we learned from a judicial source.

A committal order was issued against the two individuals by Mr. Jean-Louis Bruguiere, examining judge at the Paris court, the same source also indicated.

They are Larbi Beddiaf, an Algerian citizen, and his son Hakim, 19, a French citizen. They were arrested on Wednesday at their domicile in Colombes, a suburb of Paris. There, investigators found a "scorpio" clip, a Czech weapon, and about 150 ammunition rounds. These included ammunition for assault and 7.65-mm rifles.

The father was also charged with infraction of the PTT [French Post Office] code. That is because in another residence—a house located at Morsang-sur-Orge (in the Paris area)—investigators discovered a scanner and some documentation.

The two individuals under investigation are said to have been in relation with FIS sympathizers suspected of belonging to a network of traffickers in Algerian administrative documents. These traffickers are already under investigation.

They are Elhadj Chaib Eddour, 38, Ahmed Seba, 27, Hassan Tobal, 26, and Abderrahmane Messaoui, 30. Three of them were arrested at Lille (Nord) at the end of last March. A search at Ahmed Seba's domicile at Persan-Beaumont (Paris area) led to the discovery of a Galil assault rifle (made in Israel), two clips for 9-mm automatic weapons, and several boxes of 9-mm cartridges. In addition, a lot of Algerian administrative documents was seized during the searches that were made, in particular a lot of 500 Algerian identity cards and about 600 certificates, all blank, of the Algerian High Commissariat to National Service.

Larbi and Hakim Beddiaf chose Maitre Jacques Verges as their lawyer. (AFP).

Meeting With Madani, Belhadj; Group Recommendations

94AF0231C *Algiers EL WATAN in French 3 Jul 94 p 3*

[Article by Moulay Abderrahmane: "Ex-FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] Guidelines: All-Out Violence"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Much has been said concerning the visit that Djeddi and Boukhamkham are supposed to have paid to their former fellow prisoners. An AIS [Islamic Salvation Army] communique just confirmed that the meeting took place.

In its 1 July issue, the London magazine TABSIRA, edited by Mohamed Dnidni on behalf of Rabah Kebir, published again an article originally published in what has become the main organ of the FIS's Islamic Army, EL FETH EL MOUBINE [Manifest Victory]. The article states that the two released leaders of the banned FIS paid a visit to Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj at the Blida military prison.

The rather brief communique mentions that fact and gives an idea of what was said during the visit. It presents the visit as if Djeddi and Boukhamkham had been dutifully reporting to their immediate superiors.

After presenting a political and security evaluation, they are said to have been given a number of instructions to be sent to the armed groups through any available channels. The AIS bulletin quotes Ali Belhadj as making two recommendations. The first one, after hailing the creation of the AIS, calls for a continuation of terrorist attacks, thus strengthening the position of those who reject any truce or dialogue with the government. The second one is more enigmatic, since it reaffirms the refusal of the imprisoned leaders of the banned party to support any attempted takeover by, or merger into any other organization.

The choice of such a statement raises two hypotheses. Either it is a much belated answer to the proposal made by General Touati, member of the defunct CDN [National Dialogue Commission], who anticipated a rehabilitation of the FIS under a new acronym; or it might be a blunt refusal of Gousmi's proposal to unite all Islamist insurrection leaderships under the banner of the GIA [Armed Islamic Group], which would oppose a scathing denial to the statements supposedly made by Makhoulfi, Redjam, and Gousmi.

The rejection of the GIA as a unification structure is also part of a maneuver aimed at improving the moudjahid's image, following the massive killings of citizens. Thus, the jihad will have two armies: a "nice" one that will attack only "Toghma" forces [gangs], claim responsibility for what it does, and give the impression that it is engaged in a legitimate struggle that will in no case target civilians; the other one, more "barbaric," will be in charge of all attacks that might cause turmoil among the people or be denounced abroad. This, from now on, will be the GIA's role. It seems obvious that, in spite of this tactic, neither Belhadj, nor Baa Azzedine, the new AIS leader, will be in a position to denounce any attack by the GIA. There will even be cases when the AIS bulletin, EL FETH EL MOUBINE, will report on a GIA attack even before the GIA's organ, EL ANSAR, which is written in Peshawar and printed in Warsaw, Poland.

At any rate, this new rejection of any political solution, coming from Abassi Madani and Belhadj, emphasizes that the dialogue has reached a deadlock.

Sadi Analyses Violence; Criticizes Dialogue Effort

94AF0232B Algiers EL WATAN in French 3 Jul 94 p 3

[Article signed A.G.: "Sadi: 'The Authors of the Crime Are Those Who Killed Boudiaf'"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The day after the attack from which he escaped unscathed, the chairman of the Movement for the Republic (MPR) and general secretary of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), Mr. Said Sadi, gave an interview to the daily LIBERTE.

Analyzing this most serious act, Mr. Sadi stated that this was the first time since independence that so many means—bombs and bullets—were used to attack demonstrators. He pointed out that it was also the first time that a rally targeted by such a serious attack continued right to the end.

The MPR leader did not fail to compare this attack with the one against the late President Boudiaf. "Many have remarked that, in addition to the date chosen—29 June—this is a painfully identical replay of what happened in Annaba.

"The interests threatened by the democratic project are the same as two years ago, the methods used are similar, and the authors of the Annaba crime are present more than ever," he stated. Although he was unwilling to join the controversy as to how many demonstrators there were, the MPR chairman nevertheless stated that "militants, supporters, and other nonmembers met on 29 June (...) in spite of the fact that the climate was that of civil war. In a way, the rally of democratic forces was started by individual citizens on this symbolic date," he added.

Contrary to what is the case in other Muslim countries, there is a democratic alternative that refuses to reduce the choice to a duel between the government and fundamentalism, which are the two faces of the same coin.

As for the fact that some parties with democratic convictions did not take part in the march, Mr. Sadi pointed out that the appeal was addressed to Algerian men and women. The MPR is a citizens' movement. At no time did it ask for advice from any party as such.

Asked about the government's approach to dialogue and the possibility of a rapprochement between the democrats and the so-called moderate Islamists, the MPR chairman insisted that dialogue is a means that should tend to one or several objectives jointly defined beforehand by the parties involved, loyally and openly. "So far, we know nothing about the government's actual intentions, except that most negotiations take place behind the scenes," he said. Concerning moderate Islamism,

Mr. Sadi explained that an Islamist is one who assigns to his fight the goal of acquiring absolute power. The moderating factor would be one of the means toward such absolutism.

Speaking of the contacts that are said to have taken place with the FFS [Socialist Forces Front], Mr. Sadi denied the existence of any direct contact with Mr. Ait Ahmed. However, he called for a regrouping so we can live free and in peace in our country.

For, he said later on, it is no use for a party to attempt to withdraw into itself; any partisan approach today is suicidal.

Finally, concerning the country's immediate future, the MPR chairman pointed out that "the government, rejected at home and isolated at international level, is at a dead end (...). An unprecedented social crisis threatens to converge with the political crisis, if it should be manipulated (...). The big shots in the government, i.e., those who put Algeria in its present situation, have taken over again most of the wheels of State. The situation is worrying," he said.

Layada: History of Mitidja Group; Key Players

94AF0228A Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 14-20 Jun 94 p 8

[Article by Rachid Drif: "Layada in the Center of Urban Guerrilla Warfare"; first paragraph is ALGERIE ACTUALITE introduction]

[Text] The cells of the "Mitidja group," one of whose important members, Abdelhak Layada, is to appear before the Algiers Special Court this week, are responsible for about 100 bloody attacks.

The Mitidja group may have been born on Tuesday 16 January 1990, the day of the attack on the court in Blida that resulted in three dead, two of them from among the attackers and the other a young gendarme on duty in the courtroom. That marked the beginning of the "jihad" [holy war] of the 1990's, 10 years after Bouyali's MIA [Armed Islamic Movement] and at the time when the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] was at its peak.

At 0930 that morning, five or perhaps six young Islamists led by Nasreddine Kahli, 26, and armed with sawed-off shotguns and knives headed for the Blida court for an "operation" that was going to turn out badly. An 85-year-old man was being tried for the murder of his wife. The group entered the courtroom and pointed their weapons at the three gendarmes on duty. One of the gendarmes was killed, and Kahli and one of his companions were shot dead by the police. Later reports stated that five people had been killed. At first it was thought that the Islamists were trying to liberate the old man being tried for murder, but the police investigation led to another motive: the attackers wanted to seize the Kalashnikovs carried by the gendarmes on duty.

The group was identified. Ten people, including minors and three lycée students, were arrested for criminal conspiracy.

Operation "Amalia" had been organized by N. Kahli, a devout young man who led the "dourous" [study group] at the Hanafi Mosque in Blida.

Kahli had worked for the Treasury before becoming unemployed and had then gone to work as manager of a "hammam" [public bath]. It was there and at the mosque that he held meetings, preached, and lectured about jihad and the Islamic state. His pupils were young—from 15 to 20 years old—and diligent. Kahli had made the pilgrimage to Mecca twice despite his young age, and his recruits as well as his friends were to get themselves widely talked about. At his death, his father, in speaking to journalists, tried to understand what had happened: he never would have imagined his son getting involved in such things: "Ould El Guellil dayman mahgour" [the son of El Guellil was humiliated] was the only conclusion he could come up with (ALGERIE ACTUALITE, No. 1269, February 1990). At the time, the authorities remained quiet about the progress of their investigation, but it was clear that a movement was being organized in the still-fresh tracks of the armed movement headed by Mustapha Bouyali, who had been killed in 1987. For the purposes of the trial, arrest warrants were issued, including one for the arrest of Chakendi ("Abdelkader El Asnami"), 28, a friend of Kahli's.

Escape From Blida

Eight months later, on the night of 25 September 1990, there was a spectacular escape in Blida: 101 of the 459 prisoners in Blida's civilian prison got away. Among the fugitives were eight members of the commando group that had attacked the court. Two of them surrendered after a few days. A Kalashnikov submachine gun had been stolen from the prison. Most of the escapees were captured in the months that followed. Those involved in the attack on the court stayed in Blida and Chrea for a time before taking refuge at the home of Mansouri Meliani, a former member of Bouyali's MIA, in Amroussa near Boufarik. It was they who later formed the hard core of the group headed by Mohamed Allal "Leveilley" and Abdelhak Layada and became public enemies: Bouguetayeb Reda, Chalala Abdelhalim, Benmkhebi Fethy ("Abou Doujana"), and Nouredine Boudjemaa. All of them were natives of Blida.

Mansouri Meliani, who had been granted amnesty under Chadli, wanted to meet other escapees through Chakendi. He was in contact with the FIS leaders and Abdelkader Chebouti. The strike in June 1991 was not yet on the agenda, but a booklet on "civil disobedience" was being circulated on the sly.

The fact is that early in 1991, all the alarm bells were ringing for the security services. Too many items of information were pointing to a single conclusion: armed groups of the Islamist persuasion were forming in the

Algiers region under the very noses of the authorities. Meliani does not seem to have been under close surveillance, nor do the MIA's other former activists. The small-time delinquents in Blida were organized and trained, had a few weapons, and soon became extremely dangerous. In Algiers, the authorities were too preoccupied with the political ferment to pay attention to what was brewing in Mitidja, with the result that the first attacks a year later came as a surprise to the Army and police intelligence services, which had not made a realistic evaluation of the situation.

In the Boufarik region, the group of Blida escapees surrounding Meliani had grown in size: there were 11 of them, and they were soon joined by other individuals who had more or less gone underground following the events in June. The fugitives were armed with a Mat-49 dating from the revolution, two shotguns, and six home-made rifles.

Early in 1992, they were joined by "elements" from Algiers and by Boufarik's group: the newcomers included several "emirs": Moh "Leveilley," Layada, Zouabri, and Bentebbiche. Weapons were now in plentiful supply: one PK heavy machine gun, two Kalashnikovs, four Seminovs, one Beretta automatic pistol, one Mat-49, two shotguns, two 7.65-caliber pistols, and four Makarov 9-mm pistols. Every attack provided arms for a member of the group, who could then organize an operation on his own.

Organized Crime

The "Mitidja gang," as Moh "Leveilley's" armed group came to be known, consisted of several small, highly mobile groups. Each was headed by a leader who could organize attacks on his own and also help other groups carry out important missions—for example, an attack on an isolated police station or a patrol or brigade of gendarmes to capture weapons, ammunition, and communications equipment.

Within the gang, Moh "Leveilley" established himself as the leader. He was the emir who directed all operations and commanded a four-person "majless echoura" [consultative council]. Layada was in charge of coordination of the various groups and therefore substituted for the emir when necessary. It was that arrangement that resulted in his becoming the new leader when "Leveilley" died. Layada lived both in Baraki and in Belcourt, where his in-laws resided. He traveled frequently and met with all of the gang's active leaders. Other networks were in charge of collecting funds not only for the group but also for the families of those interned in the south.

Allal Mohamed, alias "Leveilley," was a "big-time gangster." He handled weapons with perfect ease and was an excellent driver, as was Layada, a sheet metal worker by trade and an expert on cars. Allal took personal charge of the operations, in which he participated personally, and he did not take kindly to being told what to do by an emir who had never fired a gun at his side. He was wounded

twice—in Oued Mendil and Draria—and treated by a physician who was part of the group before finally being killed in the fall of 1992. He and his “coordinator” traveled in two vehicles that were either stolen, disguised, or “clean.” The emir would often drive a J5 van behind an old DS driven by Layada, who would “clear” the road. In the van, several armed men could remain unseen and travel without attracting attention.

From January to September 1992, the attacks attributed to the gang seemed disorganized, but they were part of a simple strategy: capture as many weapons and as much money as possible in the Algiers and Blida regions. Genuine guerrilla warfare emerged, with groups in Belcourt, the Casbah, Telemly, Baraki, and Boufarik.

In May, the Gendarmerie arrested three members of the gang and obtained the complete organization chart—42 active members—of the Leveilley group. About 100 attacks had been carried out by the various cells. They included two attacks on Gendarmerie brigades (in Beni Mered and Fouka) and two on patrols (in Oued El Alleug and Oued Mendil).

There had also been three attacks on police patrols (in Boufarik and Boudouaou and on rue de la Lyre in the Casbah), an attack on the Draria urban security service, and five holdups (two at the PSA [expansion not given] in Kouba, one at the CNEP [Algerian National Savings and Insurance Bank] branch in Cheraga, and another at the brickworks in Oued Smar). There had been two attacks on armored car shipments (in Ouled Yaiche and Bouzareah). Along with that, dozens of police officers, gendarmes, soldiers, and civilians had been murdered in “isolated” operations by members of the gang acting alone or in groups of two or three.

Emir Abou Adlane

Of all the gang members we have mentioned, only Layada and Chakendi are still alive. The latter was recently sentenced to death by the Algiers Special Court. Meliani was tried and executed. Chebouti disappeared. Allal, Bentebbiche, Zouabri, Bouguetayeb, Chalala, Benmkhebi, and Boudjemaa were shot. Dozens of other members have died, and the first generation of the group has been decimated. Three important members of the gang are still in prison—the very same ones who surrendered the gang’s organization chart. If they were not among the 14 escapees from Blida Prison in 1992—an event about which the authorities have said nothing—or among the 902 who escaped from Tazoult Prison, they will certainly be called upon to testify at the trial of the “emir.” Because it is certainly for that period that Layada could be tried. He is denying the charges against him, one being that he gave the order to assassinate Tahar Djaout and other intellectuals, and says he does not know the members of the organization he allegedly headed: the GIA [Armed Islamic Group], which consisted of autonomous groups.

Layada Trial: Questioning of Armed Group Members

94AF0231B Algiers EL WATAN in French
3 Jul 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Soraya Sayed: “Special Algiers Court: Layada Testifies Again”—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Abdelhak Layada was tried for the second time yesterday, by the Algiers Special Court. The Special Court tried four cases in which he was involved together with members of four groups.

The most important charges against the defendants were: aiding, abetting, harboring, and failing to inform against criminals. The first group called to the stand consisted of Zekkioui Abdellah and Djadi Salah. The defendants were charged with harboring Layada Abdelhak when he was wanted by the security departments. Before the judge, his accomplices categorically denied having had contacts with Layada. This is also what Layada maintained later on. In his short speech, the public prosecutor asked that both defendants be given 10 years in prison.

Berra Abderrahmane was the only defendant belonging to the second group; he appeared before the court on the same counts as his predecessor.

He, too, claimed that he was innocent and never knew Layada. He indicated to the presiding judge that the statement made to the police was obtained, under “torture,” and that whatever he may have told the security forces and the examining judge was “pure invention.” In his speech, the prosecutor retraced Berra Abderrahmane’s history of terrorism. He pointed out that the group’s emir, Hamr Erras Brahim (wanted), had put him in charge of setting up “the Oued Koreich cell, where he was an active and influential member.” “His first mission,” the prosecutor indicated, “was to take charge of three ‘Afghans’ who were coming back from Kabul. His second mission was to purchase a BMW that terrorist groups would use during attacks.” Because of all these facts, the prosecution asked for a 20-year prison sentence for Berra Abderrahmane, and for a death sentence for the rest of the group, who are still wanted.

Boutemine Samir, Laagoune Amar (the brother of Layada’s wife), and Sinia Sofiane appeared before the court for harboring Layada Abdelhak during March of 1993. Boutemine, a psychology professor at the university, swore that he never saw Layada. He acknowledged that “my friend Sinia came to ask me if I could temporarily accommodate, for three days, a family that had been evicted by his landlord. I accepted without knowing who that family were. Later on, I learned that the family head was called Bouchouareb Mourad.” “Bouchareb Amar or Bouchouareb?” the judge asked. Layada, smiling, answered: “It was Bouchouareb Mourad, the name of the colonel you know.”

Then, pointing to Layada, the judge asked the defendant if Layada was the man he accommodated. He answered

negatively, which made Layada laugh. The presiding judge asked Layada if it was at Boutemine's that he spent three days together with his family. Layada answered: "I am afraid of the good Lord only. When I asked Brahim to find me a place where I could hide until my departure for Morocco, he took me to Boutemine, to his apartment located at Ruisseau."

He returned to his seat, calling discreetly to Boutemine, seated next to him: "Tell the truth and be afraid of no one."

Embarrassed by Layada's intervention, Boutemine ended up saying that the torture he was submitted to had caused him to lose his memory and that, perhaps, he did not recognize Layada.

In his speech, the public prosecutor asked for 20 years in prison for Boutemine and Senia, and five years for Laagoune.

In all four cases, the prosecutor let the court decide on Layada's case. The defense lawyers' speeches focused on the lack of material evidence and the torture that their clients were subjected to while in police custody.

Some pleaded straight out for the ex-FIS cause, putting forward in each case the consequences of the interruption of the election process, or again claiming that "today, all those who are close to the Islamist movement are viewed as terrorists by the State."

For all these reasons, the defense pleaded not guilty. After deliberation, the court postponed the fourth case to 4 July. In the fifth case, deliberations continued until late that evening.

Verdicts in Layada Trial Reported

94AF0231A Algiers EL WATAN in French 4 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by Soraya Sayed: "Algiers Special Court: Charges Against Layada Dismissed"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] In the four cases judged yesterday by the Algiers Special Court, the charges against Abdelkader Layada were dismissed. Three of the defendants were acquitted, and eight sentences of seven to 20 years in jail were passed against the others.

At exactly 2100, after deliberating for more than one hour, the presiding judge gave the verdict.

The three defendants in the first case, namely Zekioui Abdelkader, Djadi Salah, and Laagoune Amar, were acquitted. Boutemine Samir and Sinia Sofiane, tried in connection with the second case, were sentenced to seven years in jail. As for Berra Abderrahmane, at the close of the third trial he got a 20-year sentence.

In addition, Moudoud Salah, Zerouali Haroun, Chakroun Brahim, and Cherati Mohamed were sentenced to 10 years without parole, and Koreich Ali, 20, the group's "emir" who is still wanted, was sentenced in absentia to

life in prison. As is known, the four groups were tried by the Algiers Special Court for aiding, abetting, and harboring Abdelhak Layada during March 1992, when he was wanted by the police.

Yesterday, the special court tried another group of 25, including Abdelhak Layada.

The facts in this case date back to October 1992 when, after a violent encounter in the Ferroukha Mountains at Soumaa (Blida), the police arrested two armed terrorists belonging to the group headed by Zouabri Ali and Chira Toufik (both of whom were killed by the police). The investigations, and the confessions of the two terrorists apprehended led to the arrest of all members of the support and logistics network, and the members of another armed group headed by Djillali Belgacem.

Present at the trial with another 24 defendants, Djillali Belgacem first denied his participation in terrorist attacks. However, after persistent questioning by the judge, he finally acknowledged that he was the author of the arsons that targeted the Soumaa Souk El Fellah and telephone center, the assassination of two gendarmes, and the attempted assassination of the Soumaa DEC [expansion not given]. Asked about the reasons that prompted him to commit these crimes, the defendant answered: "They issued me a 'fetwa.' I carried it out..."

The judge then attempted to lecture him on what the public good and the concept of fatherland mean, while quoting Koranic verses in passing. At this very moment, Belgacem answered, bowing his head: "Someone should have told me that long before..."

The other defendants who took the witness stand mostly denied the facts of which they were accused. One of the defendants even went so far as to say, speaking of his brothers: "I know them only insofar as they say 'good morning' when they pay me a visit" (...); "what do you mean, you don't know your own brothers?" the judge objected. "I mean, we are not that close..." the defendant answered.

Apart from that, the most outstanding event of these hearings was when the judge asked another defendant what he had to say. "I did not do anything. Everything they wrote in the statements is false. I have nothing to do with these people." Revolted, the judge asked him: "There is nothing in the statements. You refused to talk to the security forces and to the examining judge. What is it, then, that you want to deny?" The defendant, having certainly forgotten that he did not make any statement during the pretrial investigation, persisted in denying a confession that did not even exist.

Called to the stand, Abdelhak Layada, looking very tired, told the judge that he knew none of the individuals in the dock. "Last 15 June, this Court sentenced me to death for having been the national emir of an armed group, and today you are judging me for being a member of an armed group. Tell me, am I an emir or a member?" he

told the judge. The latter told him that his name had been mentioned by one of the accused during the pretrial investigation. The hearings went on until late in the evening. We shall come back to them in our next issue.

Problems Threatening Press Distribution Discussed

94AF0228E Algiers *LE MATIN* in French 20 Jun 94
p 3

[Article by A.S.: "Need for Reorganization"]

[Text] Between a printer who demands cash on the barrelhead and a distributor who refuses to pay debts and increased charges, the print media are suffocating and in danger of disappearing.

A great many newspapers have suffered the misfortune of seeing their circulation suspended. The reason invoked by the printer: nonpayment of printing charges by the publisher. "It is logical—the result of the rules of the commercial game," the saying goes. But reality—equally commercial—is different. The rules are ignored from the start. Far from obeying the rules of the marketplace, printing costs, expenses, advertising, and the thorny problem of distribution are stifling newspapers that are struggling with severe cash problems. It often happens that newspapers that are not necessarily less efficient than others are forced to disappear. With the announcement of a rise in printing costs and the increase in the price of a daily newspaper—it seems likely to go as high as 8 dinars—other newspapers are in danger of disappearing from the newsstands.

It continues to be said that "only the most efficient will survive."

What this means is a limitation of the space reserved for freedom of expression—the only real gain since October 1988.

Of the newspapers that have disappeared so far, most have stumbled on the mechanisms of distribution.

That thorny problem has been the source of repeated suspensions and even the disappearance of newspapers.

Last March, the three state-owned Enamap [Algerian Press Distributing Service] firms (for the East, Center, and West) reported a deficit of over 70 billion centimes. Unlike the newspapers, that firm has never been threatened with disappearing. Former Minister of Communications Merzoug once looked into the matter, feeling that the suspension of *LE MATIN*, *LIBERTE*, and other newspapers was arbitrary.

Far from complying with the commercial rules—since those newspapers were bound to Enamap and the printers by contracts that were properly drawn up but unfortunately ignored by the distributor—the minister planned to reorganize the three money-losing state-owned firms into a single entity. For that purpose, his plan called for the liquidation of Enamap and the

assumption of its liabilities by the state. A very natural approach, considering that there is no reason why private newspapers should pay for the poor management of a state-owned firm.

To get off to a good new start, it was also necessary to settle once and for all the problem of newspaper distribution. For that purpose, the plan called for standardizing and regulating press distributors and improving their ethics.

That requirement is dictated by the emergence of 10 or so private distribution firms.

Those firms are far from possessing Enamap's resources and therefore far from meeting publishers' needs when it comes to nationwide coverage. They are characterized by methods that are dishonest to say the least. Concerned only with "easy profit," their unpaid debts are as high as those of the Enamap firms, if not higher. They do not pay their debts to the publishers any faster than Enamap does. In their brief existence, they have turned out to be even more small-minded than that state-owned firm.

They report completely falsified numbers of unsold copies to the publishers. And the list of defects and unfair practices, which unfortunately cannot be controlled by the publishers, does not stop there. The entire distribution mechanism therefore needs to be revised. Publishers and government authorities are bound by the urgency of that overhaul. Otherwise the reader and his right to information will suffer.

Trafficking of Illegal Goods; Logistics Problems

94AF0232A Algiers *LIBERTE* in French 4 Jul 94 p 2

[Article signed K.Z.: "The Two Bazaars"—first paragraph is *LIBERTE* introduction]

[Text] Every day, about 2,000 travelers go through Akid Lotfi, and a few hundreds through Boukanoun.

How many of these thousands of travelers loaded with disparate luggage are genuine tourists? Very few; according to customs officers, it is quite easy to distinguish "good" from "bad" travelers. One size criterion is used as a yardstick: the condition of passports that have been stamped several times a week; those of traffickers are soon dirty and the border-police stamps become illegible.

Is the fight against the fraudulent import and export of goods the responsibility of customs officers alone? No, they say. "Why is it that known traffickers are issued three or four passports every year? In order to curb illegal trafficking, we must take another look at this overliberal issuing of passports." Another criterion is used to decide between traffickers: their occupation; customs officers acknowledge that they are more lenient with the unemployed. The accepted threshold for imports of goods, set at 7,000 Algerian dinars, is subject to their assessment.

"We must be humane; it is out of the question that customs officers pay for young people..." The crowds that hurry through Boukanoun and Akid Lotfi have given their character to the two border posts; they look like two huge bazaars. Tons of goods are seized daily: essentially used and new clothes coming from Morocco, and foodstuffs diverted from the Algerian market.

This incessant traffic, the doing of human ants, takes place only on a small scale; right? Don't be so sure. "At the rate of one pound per day per person, 30 tons of coffee are diverted every month," a customs officer calculated, showing the goods seized. Everything goes through: egg cartons, meat, whole or quartered chickens, milk, legumes, bar or liquid soap, clothes from all over the world (Indonesia, Taiwan, Morocco, etc.), dates, semolina, oil, medicines, knickknacks, etc.

Successive increases in staple product prices did not curtail this traffic; some products, like coffee, infant formula of Lahda milk, have become more popular than others. An incessant fight goes on to curb this "small-scale" traffic, in accordance with the guidelines of the national and regional customs departments. All agree that good results are achieved despite the blatant inadequacy of the human and material resources available. Thus, during the first quarter of 1994 alone, violations committed by individuals involved the seizure of clothing assessed by customs at 1.264 billion of centimes. In addition—customs officers are very proud of this—800 million of centimes that travelers attempted to take fraudulently to Morocco were intercepted during the first half of 1994.

This is exhausting work when you do not have adequate resources: none of the two border posts has a scanner, a tool that is a must to speed up the flow of travelers and ensure strict control of their luggage. Worse, the Boukanoun border post is most often without means of communication: most of the time, the telephone does not work, despite repeated complaints to the Post and Telecommunication Administration, and the electric power is often cut off. And even if Akid Lotfi is getting a new image, with considerably improved work conditions, the fact remains that it was poorly designed to start with and, paradoxically, makes matters easier for passengers of the "road to unity" (see below).

All the same, border posts also have their satisfactions and their special days. Days when, breaking with the boredom of counting used clothes, foodstuffs, and household articles, customs officers haul in a good catch. Like the interception, during our stay, of 100,000 French francs that an expatriate from Germany had concealed in his vehicle; or the discovery of some 100 Artane packs that a young man had cleverly concealed in his jacket sleeve.

Administrative Reorganization: New Governors

94AF0230B Algiers LIBERTE in French 26 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by Nazim B.: "Interior Minister Announces Big Gubernatorial Shake-Up"]

[Text] The shake-up in the gubernatorial corps will affect 39 of the country's 48 wilayas.

Expected for some time, the change was officially announced by the minister of interior yesterday at a press conference at Government House. Also in attendance were the minister delegate for local government, Mr. Kasdali, and cabinet director Seriak. Unaffected by the shift were the 10 wilayas in the south, whose governors will continue in their present positions. The new governors include 12 incumbent governors transferred to different wilayas, three officials in the Ministry of Interior, 12 *daira* chiefs, one APW [Governorate Popular Assembly] president, one DEC [expansion not given], two directors of public works, five secretaries general, and three executive directors. Mr. Meziane Cherif said the transfers were an inevitable part of the current transition period but necessitated primarily by the need to reestablish the authority of the state and regain the citizenry's confidence. He noted that the "representatives of the state" at the local level will be responsible for implementing the government program on the ground. A program that is to be submitted at the end of this week to the National Transition Council (CNT) for approval. Mr. Cherif said the head of state wants to see concrete results, on the ground, and in the very near future—in no more than eight months. Barring instances of "force majeure," "no failures and no coming up short will be tolerated." The minister then turned to the post-1986 period characterized among other things by "disorder," with the disappearance of executive councils, loss of gubernatorial prerogatives, breakdown on the financial side, and marginalization of the *daira* chiefs, bereft of representativity. According to Mr. Meziane Cherif, this state of affairs inevitably led to a rupture between the administration and the citizen. At the same time, keeping "bridges" open for contact with the populace is one of the governors' primary missions, perhaps the most important. From now on, every governor must receive up to 200 citizens a week to hear their complaints and suggestions.

This unprecedented new procedure obliges local authorities to find concrete solutions to all the problems brought to them—or face the consequences. "Henceforth, no citizen will be ignored."

Mr. Seriak also said that following the example of the interior minister himself, who receives groups of people from every corner of the country, "this practice should be adopted at every level of the bureaucracy, so the state will not be sealed off from the social environment." The minister admitted that most of the laws and regulations now governing local administration are obsolete and should be enforced with considerable flexibility pending the expected promulgation of the *wilaya* and commune codes 2 months from now.

"The mission that awaits the governors is an important and dangerous one entailing sacrifices on their part." The way things are going, we might be tempted to add it

is proof of their courage and loyalty to the state that they even agree to accept such an onerous task.

Report on Drug Addiction Among Prisoners

94WD0489Z Algiers LE MATIN in French
26 Jun 94 p 17

[Article by H. Nissa: "Prisons: One Prisoner Out of Four Is a Drug Addict"—first paragraph is LE MATIN introduction]

[Text] One common-law inmate out of four is a drug addict. Yet, drug use is not the reason for their incarceration. In most cases, they are in prison for more ordinary causes such as: aggravated assault, homicide, indecent assault, and above all being caught in the act. The large proportion of thefts is due to the fact that they are committed to obtain the financial means to purchase drugs. Here is a sketch of a still darker reality

The types of drug used are, in order of importance, alcohol, medicines, medicines in association with alcohol, soft drugs, soft drugs in association with alcohol, and hard drugs

Three factors encourage inmates to consume medicines as drugs: the lack of any penal risk, as it is not illegal, the price of these products, and the ease with which they can be obtained through doctors' prescriptions and the pharmacies that fill them.

Drug Addicts Distribution by Type of Charges

Charges	Frequency	
	Number	Percentage
Theft	108	46.3
Aggravated assault	54	22.9
Indecent assault	31	13.5
Homicide	14	6.2
Others	24	10.1
Drug dealing	2	1.0
Total	233	100.0

What are the characteristics of the prisoners who form this population of drug-addicted inmates? The first one is their age. According to a survey of the forensic medicine department of the Mustapha University Hospital, covering a period of seven years, most drug addicts are at most 29 years old, with minors accounting for one tenth of the total population.

The second factor is the prisoners' low level of education: practically all these drug addicts are below the average education level.

Distribution by Education Level

Instruction level	Frequency	
	Number	Percentage
Illiterate	85	36.7
Primary	90	38.6
Average	54	23.2
Higher	4	1.5
Total	233	100.0

Distribution by Age

Age	Frequency	
	Number	Percentage
16-19	21	9.1
20-29	135	58.2
30-39	62	26.5
40-49	12	5.1
51 and over (sic)	3	1.2
Total	233	100.0

The behavior of drug addicts in prison is different from what it would be in normal hospital surroundings. In prison, their attitude is much more violent: self-mutilation, refusal to eat, eating foreign substances, and suicide attempts.

Mutilations include phlebotomies, gashes on the chest and abdomen, cuts on the wrists and forearms.

These various types of behavior and ways of acting in most cases reflect demands: to go to the prison clinic consultation, to get psychotropic medicines, or to be put in solitary confinement, the better to enjoy narcotics use.

However, in this population of drug addicts, some actually try to commit suicide.

The authors of these attempts have recourse to the massive use of medicines, to wounds made by sharp instruments, or to other desperate attempts such as jumping from a high place.

Distribution According to Past Psychopathological Troubles

Past psychopathological Troubles	Frequency	
	Number	Percentage
Without	194	83.4
With	39	16.6
Total	233	100.0

Distribution of Drug Addicts According to Their Criminal Records

Criminal Record	Frequency	
	Number	Percentage
Repeat offenders	123	52.7
First-time offenders	11	4.3
Total	233	100.0

According to the above-mentioned survey, those attempting suicide are in most cases prisoners with a history of psychopathological troubles.

The existence of this category of drug addicts, through the example it may provide, might alone warrant giving due consideration to the population of drug-addicted inmates.

Unfortunately, in our prisons there are no medical psychiatric structure to take care of these patients and help them prepare for their social rehabilitation.

As a result, one-half of all prisoners commit subsequent offenses.

Sonatrach Signs Contract With Italy

94AF0230D Algiers LE SOIR D'ALGERIE in French
25 Jun 94 p. 2

[Article: "Algeria To Deliver 1.8 Billion Cubic Meters Per Year to Italy"]

[Text] Sonatrach [National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons], the national hydrocarbon company, and Italy's SNAM [National Gas Pipeline Company] signed a draft agreement Tuesday in Milan providing for delivery of 1.8 billion cubic meters [m^3] of liquefied natural gas (LNG) per year to Italy over a 20-year period starting in 1996.

The accord was signed by the director general of Sonatrach, Mr. Abdelhak Bouhafs, and SNAM president Vittorio Meazzini, in the presence of Mr. Luigi Meanti, president of the ENI group and 1991-1994 president of the International Natural Gas Union.

SONATRACH says this is the first time SNAM, a long-time SONATRACH client, has signed a long-term contract for LNG deliveries.

Algerian LNG will be transported to the recently renovated terminal of Panegaglia a la Spezia near Genoa, a site already receiving deliveries of Sonatrach's LNG. With this new contract, the total volume of natural gas delivered to SNAM will increase to 21.5 billion m^3 per year, in addition to the 4 billion m^3 destined for ENEL, the electric power company.

According to Sonatrach, these quantities represent more than 40 percent of Italy's consumption, making that country Algeria's largest client—and Sonatrach Italy's biggest supplier.

In addition, Sonatrach says, with this contract the objective of boosting exports to the level of 60 billion m^3 per year by the year 2000 "is for practical purposes achieved."

Mr. Bouhafs and Mr. Meazzini expressed satisfaction at the successful negotiation of this contract, emphasizing its importance for the two companies.

Mr. Bouhafs, who noted that SNAM is a traditional client, hailed "the opening of a new LNG route for SNAM," noting that "Algerian LNG can be found today in every terminal in Europe."

Mr. Meazzini said he was "happy to see the conclusion of this contract, after lengthy discussions, coincide with the world natural gas conference." He said he was "very pleased" to be able to count on "these 40 billion m^3 during the next 20 years." The current contracts, added to Italy's own production, "will enable us to cover our needs into the first years of the next century," said the SNAM president.

Present also at the press conference were personages as important as Mr. Williams, manager of Shell International, Mr. Meanti, outgoing president of the UIG (International Natural Gas Union), and Mr. Rasmusen, who becomes UIG's president when the current congress ends.

Options for Restructuring Sonatrach: Pros, Cons

94AF0230C Algiers LE MATIN in French 12 Jun 94
pp. 1, 3

[Article by M. Hadjersi]

[Text] Workers in the hydrocarbon sector want to see Sonatrach [National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons] restructured.

If the national hydrocarbon company is to become "a powerful industrial and commercial hub that can satisfy the international market, it must not only improve its current structures but also assimilate enterprises directly involved in producing, refining, and commercializing hydrocarbons," says the National Federation of Oil, Gas, and Chemical Workers (FNPGC).

In a report on merging the country's hydrocarbon enterprises, sectoral labor leaders say such a move "should not be confined to financial aspects but should integrate all the factors of development."

Two variants are advanced by the federation. The first is to group existing enterprises by type of activity and integrate these groups into Sonatrach as divisions. The second option calls for totally revamping Sonatrach's current organization, by merging all enterprises in the sector into a single group that "will be responsible for five broad areas of activity: exploration and production, transportation and transport, construction and oil infrastructure, production of derivatives, and finally marketing."

The union report says these activities could be managed by director generals who would "constitute a directorate, headed by a president-director general who can surround himself with vice presidents responsible for the various functions."

According to the federation, the advantage of such a restructuring is that it would make Sonatrach a true industrial group that "embraces all the major functions of an international and is consistent with Sonatrach's commitment to be a petroleum and industrial group active both upstream and downstream in the hydrocarbon sector."

Rejecting the restructuring vehicles now "in vogue"—holding companies and subsidiaries—the FNPGC believes turning Sonatrach into a holding company would "offer only false solutions to real problems if done solely to provide financial linkage between the companies, and the profits will be insufficient to generate a dynamic of growth." The same goes for "subsidiarization" of existing enterprises, which "would not afford them any respite, under current conditions."

The FNPGC also touches on human resources, noting that workers in the sector "have amassed a wealth of experience and widely recognized know-how."

Even more, it believes Algerian enterprises operating under the same conditions the foreign companies "will be able to perform to international standards."

Not glossing over imperfections, the unionists argue that expert analyses of the sector's enterprises show they are "experiencing continuous erosion of the factors for stability." The report adds that most equipment is "in an advanced state of decay. On average, equipment is between 10 and 15 years old, sometimes older."

Today's hydrocarbon sector enterprises were born from the Sonatrach restructuring that created Naftal [National Enterprise for Refining and Distributing Petroleum Products], ENGTP [National Major Petroleum Projects Enterprise], Enep [National Petroleum Engineering Company], Naftec, Enip, ENPC, Asmidal, Enafor, ENSP, Enageo, Egzik, Egziz, [expansions not given] and Sonatrach.

Notwithstanding FNPGC's proposals, Sonatrach management seems to have no plans to restructure. For now, the national hydrocarbon company is banking on a development plan whose objectives can be summed up in intensified exploitation, improvement of recovery rates for reserves in place in oil deposits already exploited, development of natural gas deposits, and augmentation of natural gas exporting capacity.

Is there some way to bridge the differences between the vision of the workers and that of Sonatrach's management?

Shortage of Funds, Equipment for Garbage Collection

94AF0226C Algiers EL WATAN in French 22 Jun 94 p 5

[Article by Zineb O.: "Algiers: Unhealthy Conditions Grow Worse"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The capital has recently become a real "dumping grounds," and several of its working class neighborhoods have simply turned into "garbage dumps." The People's Council of the City of Algiers (CPVA) and its Sanitation Department seem unable to stay on top of things.

According to the head of the CPVA, there are many reasons for the situation. To begin with, there is a flagrant lack of equipment. He says that "since the arson that completely destroyed 14 garbage compactors in the Bab-Ezzouar lot, we can no longer collect all the household refuse in the capital. The few trucks we have at present, and they are in constant use, are not enough by themselves to do the work of the compactors, especially when you consider that the volume of each compactor equals that of five trucks."

The president of the CPVA points out that "there are only 10 compactors and 30 trucks with which to collect a daily volume of household refuse estimated at nearly 1,600 metric tons, whereas the international standards set by the WHO for a city of 2 million inhabitants calls for 166 compactors." The president of the CPVA adds that besides the above-mentioned reasons, "there exists within the institution a number of people who want to bring the CPVA to its knees at all costs by sabotaging what few resources it has. In any case, at the beginning of the year we asked the government for an appropriation enabling us to purchase 35 compactors in the immediate future."

The appropriation was granted by government authorities, and the compactors were scheduled to arrive early in June 1994. So what happened, and why have the compactors still not been imported? For his part, the head of the Street Cleaning Department emphasizes that "the City of Algiers, which legally comprises only 15 communes, has actually been responsible for 28 more communes outside the city for several years now. Financially, that responsibility weighs heavily on the city's budget, which is estimated at 50 billion centimes per year." He said at a later point that "the 15 communes normally constituting the City of Algiers cost the CPVA only 15 million to 18 million centimes per year."

On top of that disastrous situation, there are other problems of an organizational nature. Of the 3,200 garbage collectors employed by the CPVA, two-thirds are street sweepers, and another 600 are employed as drivers, electricians, mechanics, and so on. A union leader in the SNAPAP [expansion not given] adds that "among the hundreds of operating personnel on the streets, many do nothing and allow their work to pile up."

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That means it is left until the next day to be done by a minority which, for its part, works without letup."

The secretary-general of the SNAPAP feels that the basic reason for the unhealthy state of affairs in the city of Algiers "continues without question to be linked to poor management." On that subject, he points out that "even if the CPVA had all the necessary resources for keeping the city clean, the capital would not return to its former cleanliness without clear and transparent management. Dividing the city into districts, which some officials in the CPVA recently called for, will only make the situation worse."

Pending settlement of the conflict pitting the unions (the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] and the SNAPAP) against the head of the CPVA, the residents of Algiers will continue to live with bags of garbage piling up on every street corner and to put up with the bad odors all year long.

Drought Said Worst in 5 Years

94AF0230e Algiers LE SOIR D'ALGERIE in French
26 Jun 94 p 5

[Article by N. E.Bouzaza: "Less Than 10 Percent of Needs Will Be Covered This Year"—first paragraph is LE SOIR D'ALGERIE introduction]

[Text] The drought afflicting Algeria this year is much more pronounced than any in the last five years. Grain harvests projections for the crop season under way indicate production will cover less than 10 percent of the nation's needs.

Algiers—The drought, which is also hurting sheep raisers, has for some time been spurring increased northward migration of herds, and pasturage areas such as the steppe risk being overgrazed by the large sheep population.

In view of all these problems, agricultural services directors from the wilayas met for a working meeting chaired by Mr. Noureddine Bahbouh, the minister for agriculture.

In his opening remarks, the minister put the accent on a series of emergency measures to alleviate immediate effects of the drought and on additional steps to prevent this year's poor harvest from adversely affecting the next growing season.

To do so, and on instructions from Mr. Bahbouh, the OAIC [Interoccupational Algerian Grains Office] has been tasked to collect as much seed as possible, while ONAPSA [expansion not given] takes all necessary measures to ensure availability of agricultural inputs. In addition, ONAB [National Animal Feed Office] will be called on to ensure rational allocation of livestock feed for dairy cattle.

Irrigated perimeter offices will give priority to water for perennial crops. These restrictive measures illustrate the

extent of crop damages and should spur growers as well as agricultural associations to learn how to integrate drought contingencies more fully into their future agricultural plans. This should not be impossible, given the wide dissemination of knowledge about these techniques and improved communications to facilitate circulation and exchange of useful information.

The immediate mission for ONAPSA, ONAB, and OAIC will be to identify incentive formulas, primarily in connection with supplemental imports, to ensure the best possible distribution of agricultural inputs. Priority will be given to programs to intensify production of grain and seed, dried vegetables, and potatoes for consumption and seed. As for uninsured growers devastated by poor harvests, a financing and indemnification service will be set up, as soon as the project is approved by the head of government.

The increasing movement of livestock to the north in recent days threatens to overtax water supplies in the pasturage areas. Authorities at the wilaya level must propose a way to make more water available, by bringing in water trucks or some other means.

At the same time, and to avoid the spread of disease in these harsh climatic conditions, the health services will launch a vast vaccination campaign.

Businessmen Organize To Develop Database

94AF0230H Algiers LIBERTE in French 25 Jun 94 p 9

[Article by Naima Allouche: "Economic Operators Form Regional Economic Enterprise Observatory (OREE)"]

[Text] Conceived as an institution to support technological advance, its mission will be to develop and continuously update a database on industrial and commercial activity in northeastern Algeria. A group of public and private sector economic operators from Annaba, Skikda, El-Tarf, Guelma, and Souk-Ahras have signed a firm commitment. Beyond the desire to unite to help the region's many entrepreneurs overcome the current economic slump, this creation represents a response to the above-mentioned needs in the domains of industrial information exchange and technological and economic advisory services. The observatory can serve as a nexus or point of convergence for different economic and industrial players. The brainstorming session in the conference hall of the ISGA [expansion not given] in Annaba brought together the founders of the project and others most closely concerned. The initial operating and equipment budget for the observatory is 3,570,000 Algerian dinars [DA] and 2,340,000 French francs [Fr]. For the first year only, foreign assistance for transfer and installation of systems and methods will cost DA300,000 and Fr1,420,000. The hard-currency portion of the budget will be drawn from bilateral cooperation credits. The dinar portion would be covered partially, to the tune of about DA1 million, by subsidies and revenues from observatory services. The remainder will have to be

supplied by founding members and supporters. Presiding at the work session was Mr. Boudraa Faycal (former minister for heavy industry), who expects the observatory to offer an array of important products: listings, documentation, technical solutions, research and advisory services. These information products should help clients put together the strategic information they need to make decisions. The entirety of the foreign contribution has already been secured by a Fr1 million commitment from the French Embassy, though other foreign commitments may also materialize. We note in that regard that the founders signed a draft agreement for creation of a SARL [limited liability company] to be capitalized at DA5 million. A proposed board of directors and by-laws will be submitted for consideration on 28 June 1994. The first signatories on the proposed observatory are Sider, FerroviaL, Asmidal, Orelait [Eastern Regional Office for the Production of Milk and Dairy Products], ISGA, ENIP, ORCA, MIRA, SECOO, MIB, Octopus, ENCC, ADAF, ENGTH, and ENRIEST from the public sector, and Allal, Boudiaf, Mansouri, Behlachine, and Kellout from the private sector.

IRAQ

European Stand on Sanctions Discussed, Analyzed

94LH0074A Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
8 Jun 94 p 10

[Article by Muhammad Turki al-Dauri: "Western Europe and Iraq: Between Economic Partnership and Political Choice"]

[Text] During the past few months, Baghdad has seen a large number of European economic, political, and unofficial delegations come to Iraq for two basic purposes: the first is to learn at first hand the truth about the Iraqi people's situation under the iniquitous blockade; the second is to study the opportunities presented by the Iraqi market to all the nations of Western Europe. The Western European private sector and companies sent the lion's share of these delegations, especially France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Austria. Hopefully, more of these delegations will arrive in the next few weeks to meet with and talk with various Iraqi political and technical ministries and organizations.

The visit of these delegations to Baghdad, despite no decision as yet to lift the economic blockade over the country, was not surprising or unexpected on the part of Iraqi official quarters. Since the end of the coalition's attack on Iraq, and after America's goals behind the attack on Iraq became very clear, the Western European nations found themselves in an unenviable position. On the one hand, they had joined the United States in its aggression against Iraq and, on the other hand, as a result of their political choice to join ranks with the United States, they quickly discovered that they had sacrificed their economic interests, not only in Iraq but also in nearly all the Arab region. This consequence was a kind

of misunderstood and, perhaps, miscalculated contradiction for many European politicians. One Italian deputy, a prominent politician in the Christian Democratic Party, who visited Iraq in 1993, referred to this situation, saying: "Europe entered the war against Iraq and hoped to obtain a share of the spoils that the coalition countries would reap from this aggression. However, in fact, it has so far not received so much as a crumb, since American firms have controlled all contracts for rebuilding, rearming, and oil with all the Gulf states."

Europe's Political Loss

The European loss has not only been confined to economic interests in the region. A country like France, which has had a "distinguished" position in the Arab-Zionist struggle has since the 1967 war hoped that it would have a front seat among the nations that would be sitting at the negotiating table when all sat down to resolve this struggle. However, France found itself in the "peace conference" held in Madrid in 1992 and dominated by the United States, occupying an insignificant back seat, as if it were a witness to events and not a principal player. Roland Dumas, the French foreign minister at that time, expressed France's displeasure and frustration at the marginal role that France had been given to the United States secretary of state at that time, James Baker, when the two met in Washington in 1993. At the end of the meeting with Dumas, Baker commented: "I don't know if we were speaking as friends or enemies."

The relationship between Western European countries and the United States since that time has included a long list of disputes and problems over several issues, such as the GATT economic treaty, the conflict in former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina), dealing with Russia and Yeltsin, the new world order, the future of NATO, and the economic and political unity that Europe aspires to attain. These disputes have led to a series of contradictory statements, comments, and positions that are clarifying—beyond a doubt—the existence of two positions: one of them European; the other, American.

European and American Positions Vis-a-Vis Iraq

The position of certain European countries, especially France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, toward Iraq and the economic blockade imposed upon it, is an expression—as well as a crowning—of the differences in the European and American positions. It might clearly represent the difference in the Security Council's backing away from the subject of the economic blockade and the extent of Iraq's commitment to Security Council resolutions. In the meeting on 18 March 1994, France emerged in the forefront of nations, calling for the reevaluation of the Iraqi position in accordance with the terms of Security Council Resolution 687. That is the start of the process that ultimately will lead to lifting the economic and political embargo imposed upon this country and might reinforce the Western European international initiative

with regard to the consultations that occurred last March, according to the deputy prime minister's statement at a press conference held on 1 June 1994.

The Western European position with regard to Iraq not only had hundreds of "humanitarian" or "moral" considerations, given the fact that all of those who visited Iraq discovered the truth about the Iraqi people's situation following the blockade. They found it difficult to remain silent vis-a-vis a crime aimed at an entire people. The economic conditions that exist in Western Europe at the present time—unemployment, economic recession, lowered productivity, social problems, bankruptcies—are all reasons that compel the European private sector to search for alternatives to provide it with fixed and stable interests, as well as to compensate it for the considerable sacrifices made as a result of the coalition's aggression against Iraq. Another example of these losses is the American Boeing Company's receiving the contract for aircraft that Saudi Arabia was negotiating with the European Airbus Company, which was in its final stages. This contract, valued at several billion dollars, was secured for the American firm as a result of a telephone conversation between United States President Bill Clinton and Saudi King Fahd. Moreover, the unsuccessful visit by French Prime Minister Balladur to Saudi Arabia at the beginning of this year left French mouths filled with bitterness, because it achieved nothing of note. He returned to France empty-handed, which generated harsh criticism in various French political and press circles.

Therefore, the visits of European delegations are gaining special importance, since they unarguably express a European desire to search for a major, stable economic partner in this region, which occupies a very high position vis-a-vis the European continent's strategic interests. With regard to the Western European nations, Iraq represents four important points:

1. Huge oil reserves represent a stable source of energy, since the United States has usurped all the Gulf oil, including Iranian oil.
2. The Iraqi people total some 20 million. This number means vast possibilities of selling various European goods and products, along with the possibility of paying [to produce] these products.
3. The Iraqi people's capability to create, build, and do business with European products and equipment with a high degree of competency forms a huge demand for them that cannot be satisfied in any other Arab oil country.
4. Iraq's stability is a measurement of the instability in many other Arab countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, and even Saudi Arabia.

Iraq: Future Strategy

However, the new-old European thrust toward Iraq must not stay only within a technical or economic framework.

Iraq cannot, and will not—under any circumstance—be a free market for Western Europe or anyone else. Iraq is a civilization and history, economic possibilities, and a political position. It is historic leadership at a critical national time. Therefore, the European search for economic partnership with Iraq must be accompanied by, or paralleled by, clear political positions that are supportive of Iraqi rights. Iraq has many objective reasons for adopting such a position. During the coalition's military aggression against this country, Iraq found itself alone facing huge armies that had come to attack it. As for the Western European governments and firms, whose economies benefitted greatly from Iraq, they either supported the aggression or remained silent, watching without lifting a finger. This negative position resulted from a number of international and regional factors. However, one of the most important of these reasons was the previous Iraqi policy of not having a linkage between economic and political positions in dealing with the Western European nations.

As for now, the opportunity is available for such an initiative. Most European countries feel that their previous political position vis-a-vis Iraq has led to a number of losses that none of the other Arab countries can compensate for. Therefore, by virtue of our knowledge of the private sector in Western Europe, given that all large and small political parties there are directly and principally dependant on these firms with regard to their election campaigns, in order to reach the threshold of power in this European country or that, it is Iraq's right to demand that these companies—and these countries—forge a direct link between economic contracts on the one hand and political positions toward this country on the other. When a French company, for example, comes on a mission concerning oil and to sign a long-range contract with Iraq, it is the right of the Iraqi negotiating authority to ask what this company can do for Iraq politically. Which political party represents its interests on the French scene, and what are the guarantees that could be offered to Iraq in order to meet any future problem on regional and international levels?

Western European countries are ready now to be effective economic partners with Iraq but, when reaching an agreement with these nations, Iraq must create a linkage between this partnership and the political position with regard to Iraq. Those who try to have economic dealings with this country must know how to help the Iraqi people, not only in their present difficult circumstances, but also in achieving their hopes and aspirations for prosperity, progress, and stability over the long term.

Absence of Medicine Said Causing Half Million Deaths

94LH0079A Paris AL-MUHARRIR in Arabic 13 Jun 94
p 6

[Article by Kamal Hasan Bakhit: "Half Million Iraqis Dead Because of Drug Shortage"]

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[Text] Despite the fact that medicine and food are not mentioned in the Security Council's resolution imposing the blockade on Iraq, the countries of the Western coalition, considered to be the most advanced in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, refuse to export basic drugs to Baghdad.

The strange thing is that these countries have differing and diverse excuses, some of which are quite ridiculous. For example, a patient with heart disease in Iraq faces certain death because producer countries are not permitted to export this medication to Iraq.

Up to this point, the matter might be quasi-normal with regard to the campaign to which Iraq is being subjected these days, but it is not normal that Britain justifies the reason for its ban on exporting this medicine on grounds that it contains material that "could" be used to manufacture explosives!

This is said before all the world, despite the fact that the British know that hundreds of tons of this medicine could not make one ordinary bomb.

Therefore, the Iraqi patient lives on the brink of death, because he lacks basic medicine.

AL-MUHARRIR met with Dr. Shawqi Sabri, the first undersecretary of the Iraqi Ministry of Health, who summarized the situation as follows: "The powerful international blockade of our country manifests hatred toward the Iraqi sick, toward young and old, depriving them of all medications, especially those that save lives, despite the full knowledge that the lack of these drugs means the loss of lives of a great number of patients. Therefore, the Iraqi family lives an ordeal of considerable tragedy because, lacking these basic drugs, it is losing some of its members."

When he was asked about the facts of a ban on exporting pectoral angina medicine to Iraq, he said: "We have in fact asked for this medication from a British firm. Our request was only a quarter of the amount we used to import before the embargo, because our income is small, and despite the increase in numbers of those suffering from this disease. The British company's reply came by telex on 15 March 1993, giving approval to its shipment, after we had remitted \$150,000. They received the money, but did not send the medicine!"

"As company sources said, the reason lies with the British Government's refusal to export this medication to Iraq because it contains material that "might" be used in the manufacture of explosives!"

Dr. Shawqi asks: "What do I, as a doctor, say to a patient suffering from a thrombus or pectoral angina, when he cannot be treated because of a lack of medicine, which comes in small pills that are placed under the patient's tongue?"

He went on to say: "You must speak out loudly, so that we can put the facts before the international community."

How do you deal with treatable illnesses?

"With intense care by us and with the generosity of certain international organizations that know the facts of the dangerous situation in our country."

What about deaths among children?

"They increase every day at high rates, as a result of the severe shortage of drugs. Childhood diseases kill large numbers of our precious people, as well as the diseases of old age, cancer, and others. More than one-half million Iraqi citizens have died because of the medicine shortage. Hundreds of deaths have occurred among pregnant women because of the lack of anesthetics.

"We have written to international organizations, especially UNICEF, about the situation. They visited Iraq and saw with their own eyes our actual situation. Then they sent messages to their headquarters, and some quantities of anesthesia cylinders were sent to Amman and, then, to Baghdad. However: Is this a proper process? Is it logical for us to tell a woman who is ready to give birth: Wait until the anesthesia arrives from Amman?"

"Those who talk about defending human rights must think about how the imperialist countries are treating human beings in Iraq and how they are violating their rights."

Dr. Shawqi ended his statement by sending his appreciation to the international organizations that are conscious of their responsibilities vis-a-vis events in Iraq, and that sent assistance in this regard, despite the fact it is a drop in the sea of actual needs of a country like Iraq.

Justice, Interior Ministries Address Crime Issues

94LH0077A Baghdad ALIF BA' in Arabic 8 Jun 94
pp 16-19

[Symposium with members of Justice and Interior Ministries by Mansi Salamah, Hamid 'Abdallah, and Dhikra al-Samirani; place and date not given: "Crime, Delinquency Primarily Nurture-Related"—first three paragraphs are ALIF BA' introduction]

[Text] There is no society free of crime. An ideal city such as Plato described does not exist in our age. If laws are social values expressed in the language of law, crimes are the offspring of accidental, degenerate, and abnormal values created by more abnormal circumstances.

Criminologists classify criminals into two categories. There are professionals so addicted to crime that it has saturated their souls and become part of their formation—they make up the gangs that engage in organized crime. The second category are those who have slid into the world of crime because of weak ethical resistance, low level of awareness, and other circumstances. Our society still knows organized crime only in a very limited way. Our interest therefore will focus on the other category of crime. What we want to determine is the

amount of criminal activity, the kind of crimes committed, the motives for crime, how to prevent it, and the extent to which existing laws are a deterrent.

These and other matters were the subject of a symposium that ALIF BA' held in coordination with the Interior and Justice Ministries. Participating for the Justice Ministry were Judge Nawwar Muhammad Nasir (head of the al-Karkh criminal court), Judge Muhammad 'Abd-al-Muhsin (general director of the Justice Ministry's legal department), and Judge Akram al-Sa'idi (investigating judge for al-A'zamiyah). Participating for the Interior Ministry were Brigadier General Akram 'Abd-al-Razzaq (for the public police), Dr. 'Adnan Yasin (administration to combat economic crime), and Lieutenant Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah (administration to combat economic crime).

Causes, Motives of Crime

[ALIF BA'] First we must define the kind of crime that is widespread now; then we can look for its circumstances; afterward we can discuss ways of preventing it or stopping its occurrence. I think the ball is in the hands of the police, since they are more concerned about the matter than anyone else.

['Abd-al-Razzaq] Criminal behavior is defined by a number of factors: some environmental, others social, economic, and psychological. If we acknowledge that the graph of crime has witnessed a rise recently, the cause can be traced to the exceptional circumstances to which the country has been exposed—principally the embargo.

[ALIF BA'] Do you mean that need drives some people to steal?

[Akram] Need is one of the most important reasons driving people to crime.

[ALIF BA'] But not all who feel the pressure of the blockade have become delinquent!

[Akram] Some of those whose resistance collapses and who become weak in the face of need take the path of crime. They are the exception, of course.

[Nasir] I don't agree with Brig. Gen. Akram's view. From my experience in the judiciary not a single case motivated by need has come before me. Not a single thief has ever stood before me who stole to provide his family with their daily bread. Thefts are either big thefts—stealing luxury cars worth millions of dinars—or very small thefts that only express the beginning of delinquency on the part of the criminal. As for need alone, I have never seen it constitute a motive for crime.

[ALIF BA'] Which social strata are candidates for producing criminals?

[Akram] Young people as a class are the most likely to become involved in committing crimes—especially the 13-17 age group.

[Yasin] I don't think that need is the basic motive for committing crime. The proof lies in the records of economic crime. If you browse through the records, you find crimes differing in size, kind, and kind of perpetrator; but the goal—fast gains by illegal means—is the same. Crimes of fraud are committed by elements who can be linked by no common denominator either socially or by age. There was a physician who counterfeited a certain kind of medicine and smuggled it into the markets under the name of a Jordanian firm whose name he appropriated. I think this crime was much more serious than the theft of a small article by a boy unaware of the seriousness of the act he had committed. There are merchants who have imported a kind of unhydrogenated oil that causes major complications when consumed. The aim was clear: getting rich, even illegally. This kind of economic crime was not so widespread in our society several years ago. The goal of preserving one's business or manufacturing reputation used to be as important as the goal of profit for the businessman or manufacturer.

Now, however, profit is the only goal for some businessmen. That is why the phenomena of industrial fraud and monopolization have spread and why fictitious companies have emerged to invest funds and defraud citizens.

['Abdallah] The exceptional circumstances through which Iraq has passed have clearly altered the social structure. Whereas the number of wealthy families in Baghdad used to be limited and known, and we used to know them by name and know the sources of their income and reasons for their wealth, now the number of those who possess millions, even tens of millions, has become unlimited. Real leaps in social development have occurred in some strata of society. These leaps have been accompanied by a clear disturbance of social values and traditions. All of this has produced pathological phenomena whose symptoms are crimes of various sorts.

[al-Sa'idi] I can diagnose another reason for the spread of crime: truant boys on the streets. Families used to be concerned about getting a high level of education for their children. Cooperation between the school and the family used to prevent pupils and students from playing hooky from school.

The picture has now changed, with some families beginning to push their children onto the street to engage in any sort of work. Undoubtedly, the sidewalk markets and the entry of children into the world of business at such an age are likely to lead them onto the path of delinquency—especially when some fathers do not ask their children about the source of their receipts. A related fact is the weakness of the social check. The social stigma that used to attach to a family because one of its members had stolen used to constitute a deterrent to stealing; now, however, some families see no stigma in stealing.

[ALIF BA'] However severe the pressure of the blockade has been, it is not weakening the resistance of respectable

families. What is happening is the exception. Anyone who rationalizes his delinquency on the basis of the pressure of need has carried the seed of delinquency within himself from the beginning.

[Akram] Crime is the result of predisposition plus convenient opportunity. Prevention demands treating both sides together.

The Law and Crime

[ALIF BA'] If these are some of the causes of crime, do you judges think the existing laws are sufficient to deter criminals? Is their deterrent force equal to the amount of crime?

[Nasir] I think that toughening the penalty sometimes produces negative results and worsens the criminal act. Because of the exceptional circumstances, the legislature turned to toughening the penalty for theft. The minimum punishment for theft is now 15 years, and the judge may not impose a lower term whatever the size and kind of theft. This has led those who steal to turn to theft accompanied by murder to hide their tracks. As everyone knows, thieves turn to murder for two reasons: self-defense, or to obliterate the signs of theft and destroy the evidence. Some thieves are led to set fire to the houses they have robbed with the inhabitants, as happened recently in one neighborhood of Baghdad. I therefore am inclined to classify crimes and the punishments assigned to them. It makes no sense for me to sentence a boy who stole a few pigeons because of his hobby of pigeon raising to prison for the same 15 years to which I sentence an experienced criminal who stole a car or the furniture of a house. It would be relevant for me to mention that 90 percent of crimes by juveniles under age 18 are thefts, and 90 percent of these juveniles live in poor neighborhoods. Most of them have left school and are from families that have broken up for many reasons.

[Akram] I am for giving judges flexibility in sentences for theft. I join my voice to Judge Nawwar's on the need to separate thefts into categories.

[ALIF BA'] What degree of cooperation and harmony is there between members of the police and judges?

[Nasir] The police work under the supervision of the judiciary. The police apparatus, like any other, is not free of weak individuals—but the rumors are much greater than the reality. I think that lawyers are playing a bad role in this area.

[ALIF BA'] How true is the rumor that investigation documents are tampered with inside police stations?

[Abd-al-Muhsin] A suspect's deposition sometimes is changed in police stations. There are many cases in which tampering has taken place, affecting the course of investigation and the verdict. There is always a state of conflict between the legal investigator and the police. Legal investigators say that the police do not allow them to carry out the investigation. I don't know any reason

for this. Conducting the investigation is an essential duty of the legal investigator; the policeman has no connection with the investigation if there is a legal investigator in the station.

[Akram] I don't deny the existence of bad elements in the police, as in any other apparatus, but I object to treating exceptional cases as a general phenomenon.

[Nawwar] The police are making great efforts beyond their incomes. I think that their living standard needs to be reexamined.

[Akram] If there is weakness in the performance of the police apparatus and if their response to crime is slow, the reason goes back to insufficient material resources. How can the rescue squad be present on the scene of the crime as quickly as possible if no clean, fast vehicle is available? Also, the citizen plays a big role in easing the task of the police by cooperating with them. What do you think of a citizen who refrains from reporting a crime that he sees happening before his eyes because he thinks he may be held responsible? We have set aside the 150 telephone number for reporting crimes without the need to give the informant's name or address, in addition to the direct lines in the Interior Ministry and the General Police Directorate, but we have not noticed tangible cooperation from citizens.

[ALIF BA'] But one sees policemen standing like bystanders before attacks and crimes that take place before their eyes—as if to say, "Why should I care?"

[Akram] This, too, is not a general phenomenon. I agree with you that it happens here and there, but one cannot generalize about it as a phenomenon. Such behavior has its causes. Some citizens, for example, do not treat the police as enforcers of the law, but as parties to the dispute. The case therefore assumes a tribal course, with the policeman as one of its parties. We have frequently warned about such behavior, which is flagrantly at odds with the law.

[al-Sa'idi] A large proportion of Iraqi society suffers from ignorance of the law. This ignorance frequently causes criminal acts whose perpetrators cannot assess the kind of punishment their acts entail. Most people do not know that someone charged with theft is not eligible for bail and must remain in jail until the court pronounces its verdict. Most people also do not know that someone convicted of theft is sentenced to no less than 15 years, whatever the item stolen. I think that if people realized some of these facts, the knowledge would be a factor deterring many criminals.

What Do the Crime Figures Say?

[ALIF BA'] The important question on which we need a clear, unambiguous answer is: Is the crime graph going up or down?

[Akram] If theft is the crime common in the street—especially car theft—I think that the rumors about car

theft are much exaggerated. Yesterday (the day before the symposium), the number of stolen cars in Baghdad was only four.

[Nasir] I don't agree with Brig. Gen. Akram. Most crimes that the courts handle are related to theft. As for the figure that the general mentioned—four cars stolen in Baghdad yesterday—has this figure remained constant, is it increasing, or is it decreasing? What is certain is that 1994 has seen a clear increase in the number of cases of theft accompanied by murder.

[Akram] But you have to see these statistics and figures in their exceptional context. They are the product of these circumstances, not the product of normal circumstances. The insane increase in automobile prices tempts weak-minded persons with a predisposition to crime to risk the crime. It wasn't this way a year ago.

[Nawwar] No one disagrees about that.

[Adnan] This idea is more applicable to the area of economic crime. Everyone is looking for profit; everyone wants to become a businessman. The more the markets expand, the more numerous the violations become. In Baghdad today there are over 20,000 grocers. Pricing violations are therefore increasing. In the last four months, we have apprehended 4,491 pricing violations, as well as 1,383 prohibited items.

[Nawwar] I think that strict pursuit of small pricing violations and prosecuting boys who deal in small items may push them into more serious criminal behavior. I think the pricing violations about which our brothers in Economic Security are speaking do not fall within the category of criminal activity.

[Ali] But playing tricks with citizens' food supplies is an economic crime that leads to economic sabotage that deserves the severest punishment.

[ALIF BA'] At the conclusion of the symposium, in which much was said about the causes, motives, and ways of preventing and combatting crime, we can take away the following brief summary: Responsibility for combatting crime is not limited to the police, the laws, or the judiciary who apply these laws fairly, carefully, and honestly. Responsibility begins with the Iraqi family, which can oppose crime by means superior to all the means of the police. The family can inoculate its children with educational values that will prevent all temptations from penetrating or weakening them. The blockade, with all its severity, will be unable to weaken this resistance. That is the first way to prevent crime. Next comes the role of the police, the law, and the judiciary as an aiding factor to prevent crime, combat it, and stop its spread.

ISRAEL

Capability of Christopher in Region Questioned

94AA0090A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 7 Jul 94
pp 25-26, 92

[Article by U. Galili: "Yearning for Kissinger"]

[Text] He will spend the summer peacefully. This is the prevailing assessment in the U.S. media and among the political elite in Israel regarding the future of Warren Christopher, the American secretary of state. The upcoming autumn and winter are considered seasons for contemplation in American politics, for on 2 November 1994, elections for the Senate, House, and state governors are being held. Then, as has been the precedent, the party in power pays the price for the public's disappointment in its performance, absorbing a blow for its impotence in its first two years in power.

In November, then, the blow is expected; in December, reorganization will begin, even if the changes among the top brass are postponed until January, so as not to ruin the atmosphere of Christmas and New Year's Eve. After January 1995, it will be too late to effect changes. The closer it gets to the next presidential elections, dismissals are likely to be interpreted as being at a loss, revealing an admission of failure.

The first sacrifice of the dissatisfaction with Clinton's foreign policy occurred three weeks ago in Israel. Les Aspin, former secretary of defense, who was replaced because of the failure of the United States in Somalia, came for a private visit. His many friends in Israel heard empty words of criticism from him about the American President; Aspin still felt humiliated.

To a certain extent, says one of his hosts, Aspin is Warren Christopher's temporary insurance policy, because the replacement of a foreign secretary after the replacement of the secretary of defense does not look good. Especially because the appointment of Aspin's replacement did not go smoothly: Clinton's first candidate, Bobby Inman, withdrew his candidacy, and two other candidates who were mentioned—Sam Nunn and Colin Powell—did not even want the appointment. Left without a choice, Clinton chose one who was available, not desired, and appointed William Perry.

The next in line in the list of dismissals, according to assessments, are Warren Christopher and Anthony Lake, the national security adviser. "Usually, in the middle of the term, presidents want to improve and invigorate the ranks," says the analyst for U.S. affairs, Tzvi Rafiah. "They want to give the public the sensation that they are not stagnating and that they are implementing reforms. It is definitely accepted, and this is not unusual for Clinton, that a president, within the four-year term, implements replacements in his government."

The demand for Christopher's replacement has been circulating in the United States for months and was sharply expressed in mid-June in a major NEW YORK TIMES article that encouraged the President to replace Christopher and Lake, "who have not succeeded in impressing the international diplomatic and security community regarding the role of the United States in the world." This was preceded by an article in TIME magazine at the end of May, entitled: "Clinton Considers Asking Christopher To Resign." And the goal: To curb

the continuing erosion of the President's image, which is depicted in the public opinion as the one responsible for the succession of failures in foreign policy.

The current team, according to descriptions in the American media, is stricken with pallor, which has particularly stood out in a period in which there have been many challenges in the international arena. President Clinton, indeed, acknowledged in advance that he intended to focus on internal policies, but—as *TIME* and the *NEW YORK TIMES* contend—foreign affairs are stubbornly refusing to remove themselves from the agenda. These words echoed so strongly that Clinton felt the need to give public backing to his secretary of state. But this support is likely to hold until 2 November, or until Christopher understands that he must resign.

Christopher is not running around in a panic, attests an Israeli politician who usually meets with the secretary of state. He is depending on his personal friendship with Clinton and on his political friends in Washington. And in private discussions, as it turns out, he is looser and has more of a sense of humor than is depicted by his boring and frozen facade. This is not how things appear to Professor Eytan Gilbo'a, an expert on international relations, who divides his time between Hebrew University and the American University in Washington. When asked this week to describe the position of the American team dealing with foreign and security policies, Gilbo'a used many quotes by his American political science research colleagues who had one conclusion: disappointment. The despair is so great, according to him, that the criticism became the topic of the day among the elite who determine the public agenda in Washington. But, it is apparent that the Washington debate, Gilbo'a annotates, does not necessarily occupy the average American citizen in Iowa and Oregon.

There is an entire establishment residing in institutes, in "think tanks," and appearing on television panels, says Prof. Itamar Rabinowitz, the Israeli Ambassador in Washington. The allegations of the representatives of this establishment against Christopher and his team, Rabinowitz claims, do not always deal with the essence, but more with the style, with the extent of attractiveness of the secretary of state. Christopher, say his critics, lacks the charisma and power of persuasion to tell the Americans that there is no solution to the problems in Bosnia and Haiti. In such an atmosphere, it is no wonder that Clinton is hearing things such as this from his advisers: You need a secretary of state who will give you better political service.

"There is simply an incompatibility between the man, his potential, and the needs of the international arena today," Gilbo'a says. "Christopher is a tired man, from a very outdated school of foreign policy. In an era of a new world order, we need first-rate architects to mold the foreign policy, whereas Christopher is a technician. He has no vision; he is dry."

Prof. Gilbo'a recalls, in this connection, the foreign policy guide that Christopher wrote, in which he details

the benefits of negotiations, understanding, and communication over the use of force. His diplomatic culture does not even penetrate the supremacy of the United States in the world, and with such values, they are missing a historic opportunity to mold a new world order. If the United States does not become the world's police, warns Prof. Gilbo'a, it will become the world's tax collector: It will only consider imposing sanctions all the time.

"This can be viewed in two ways," says analyst Tzvi Rafiah. "One can ask, what do you want from a secretary of state? After all, the president does not take an interest in this. And this can be viewed in another way: Why, when the president is busy with other matters, does the secretary of state not fill the void and take initiatives?" Christopher's greatest lost opportunity, in Gilbo'a's opinion, has been the episode of hostility with North Korea, in revealing its nuclear plan for international censure. "Suddenly, Christopher disappears and Carter appears in a private delegation," says Gilbo'a, "and Carter obligates the official government with a policy that it did not exactly consolidate."

Prof. Gilbo'a says that this episode disturbs him, as a researcher. "There is a paradox here," he explains, "right in the period following the Cold War, when the United States is the only superpower—right in this period, there is an enormous reduction in its foreign policy. Its strength is suddenly much more restricted, and its trustworthiness is at a low state. This could be seen when the Americans fled like mice out of Somalia, when in Bosnia, they are being provoked by them, when a group of generals in Haiti ridicules them. No previous government would have stood for such provocation."

THE WASHINGTON POST, in its current reports on the State Department, treats Christopher and his team with sarcasm, as a helpless group of good-for-nothings. There is a sense that, first, the United States threatens and later, it is scared of its own threats. Prof. Gilbo'a says explaining the position of the American media. If you cannot carry out your threats, then do not threaten.

James Baker, for example, the secretary of state whom everyone in Israel now misses, would not have verbalized a threat of sanctions, Gilbo'a claims, finding out later that Russia and China were against it. "It is the ABCs of diplomacy. Nor would he have stood before the European Community and hesitantly asked about the need for intervention in Bosnia. He would have led the process. He would not have threatened China that he would remove them from the "most favored nation" status and, in the end, retract his threats. He would not have allowed Hafiz al-Asad to mock him so on his visits."

Even in Israel, a note of criticism against Christopher can already be heard among the words of praise that are usually reserved here for American politicians. Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beylin takes care to point out Christopher's contribution in obtaining a compromise

on the return of the exiled Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] members and in obtaining a cease-fire in a reporting operation in Lebanon. "Christopher is indeed an unusual friend to Israel," says Beylin, and to his words he immediately adds a clear and intended message for Christopher and his people: "What we need, at the moment, is someone who will advance the peace process."

At the time of Les Aspin's visit to Israel, Beylin delivered a lecture on Israel-United States relations in the new world order. He aimed his words at American ears: Come and interfere in the channel of talks with the Syrians, do not tarry. These words reflect Beylin's very clear position, according to which, without the Americans, negotiations with the Syrians will not move. Beylin thinks that Rabin and al-Asad have already said everything that needs to be said, and that what remains now is for someone with initiative, like Henry Kissinger, to take matters into his own hands and advance the negotiations. Otherwise, there will be no peace; now there is a chance to continue the momentum, and if nothing happens within the next few months, the lost opportunity for an agreement with Syria will stay with Israel for a long time, and there will be no vindication for this.

In closed discussions, Beylin expresses an even more extreme opinion: As long as Christopher serves in the role of secretary of state, nothing will happen. They do not care, he painfully says to his closest friends, and we care very much. Shim'on Peres, by the way, does not like his deputy's approach, and he always sweats uncomfortably when Beylin expresses himself in this manner.

"If I tried to contend with the claim of Christopher passiveness, as an American," says Rafiah, "then I would come and ask: And has Yitzhaq Rabin already told the Americans, 'Come'? So what if Beylin wants it; the question is, does Rabin want it?"

In the prime minister's circle, it is affirmed that without the Americans, it is impossible to move a millimeter in the Syrian sector. The reason: The Syrians are not prepared for any secret contact or any mediation that is not American. According to groundwork by those conducting the negotiations in Israel's name, and under the supervision of the prime minister, the Syrians essentially want good relations with the United States, and the standstill has resulted only because the Americans have no alternative. But, if this is the groundwork, why does Rabin not turn, as did Beylin, to Christopher and forcefully ask him to intervene?

Those close to the prime minister give three reasons that prevent him from taking this step. First, according to Rabin's analysis, Clinton needs us today, in order to advance matters in the negotiations with Syria, at least as much as we need him. In this context, they recall Clinton's rise in popularity as expressed in public opinion polls after the signing of the agreement with 'Arafat in the White House. This was Clinton's best

moment since being elected, at least in his foreign policy, and the Americans accepted this agreement favorably.

The second reason: Rabin, who sees before him the entire set of relations with the United States (in the diplomatic, military, and economic realms), cannot permit himself to let them fail here. He cannot allow a situation to occur that would disturb or embarrass Clinton. A senior political source explains that which is rooted into the prime minister's set of considerations regarding Syria: "When you demand very forcible, high-profile American intervention, the phase comes in which, from their aspect, they must succeed. Therefore, there is no chance that Christopher would come here for a whole month, in the style of Kissinger's leapfrogging campaigns, unless he feels that he will truly make progress."

And there is the unavoidable question that Rabin, and even Peres, are asking themselves: Under these conditions—where, in the United States, a president is serving who expressly declared that he was elected to deal with internal problems, and where his secretary of state is on a decline—can the United States fill the role of mediator? Clinton, the political circles in Jerusalem say, is not bothered by al-Asad every morning. It is more important to him that Congress approve his universal health care bill by November, for only this can give him a strong basis for his reelection attempt in 1996. And, in the meantime, Rabin and Peres, from a distance, can satisfy themselves with an agreement with the Palestinians and the anticipated agreement with Jordan, while the Americans are the primary patrons, and can defer the agreement with Syria to a later date.

In 10 more days, Christopher is expected to arrive for a visit to the region, while in Israel, yearnings for Kissinger and Baker can be heard, in a direct criticism of his policies. "Regard for him is not fair," they say in the prime minister's circle. "We do not regard him for what he is, but we compare him to Kissinger and Baker. But every comparison does him injustice. The secretary of state does not work in an empty vacuum. One of the big questions is, who is sending him and who is he up against here in the Middle East. Kissinger was characterized by his initiative and creativity, by a lot of cunning, bordering on dishonesty, and characterized by caustic words. Nixon's America stood behind him, and before him was an Israel drenched in the shock that followed the Yom Kippur war. These were truly ideal conditions. While Baker—he did not achieve anything here, despite the fact that he was crude, belligerent, and caustic. Nothing helped him when a Jew like Yitzhaq Shamir stood opposite him. Now, he is longed for nostalgically, even though he was explicitly hostile to Israel."

And Christopher? "First of all, he is a lot older. He has no adrenaline. He is very quiet. He is a very pleasant man. He lacks the drive that Kissinger and Baker had to succeed, but it was not pleasant to sit down with Baker. And with Kissinger, certainly not—he was convinced that he was God's deputy."

Gilboa says that, even though Israel needs American mediation, this is not a case where Rabin and Peres are speaking of direct negotiations. "Perhaps they fear that Christopher's intervention will not be effective enough, and that the shrewd Syrians will run circles around him." And, while, in the office of the prime minister, one gets the impression that the regard for Christopher is more forgiving and understanding, in the foreign ministry, there are those who are rebelling against the secretary of state's upcoming leapfrogging campaign, in which no progress is anticipated. "This entire trip is simply a game. Christopher comes and goes and nothing happens. He does not dedicate time to it. He meets with al-Asad for three hours and is done. There is no continuity. He is so fearful and so gray, that he will not initiate anything. He is the king of the sleeping. He lives on his own timetable. He is so heavy in his movements. He is not successful."

Why, if so, is this criticism stated anonymously? "I hesitate to criticize him publicly," explains the foreign ministry man, "because I understand that criticism against him is also paralyzing. The result is that there has been no State Department after Baker, and the peace team is also doing nothing for the process."

Baker was in the Middle East eight times within a few months, recalls Tzvi Rafiah, and this created a momentum that resulted in convening the Madrid conference. "Kissinger spent more than a month here and moved along the Damascus-Jerusalem axis until it resulted in the separation accord between Israel and Syria, which still holds today. True, the two sides wanted to end the state of war, but it still does not change the fact that, in order to reach any sort of agreement, the physical presence of an American leader is necessary in the region, not leaving until white smoke comes out. And this will not be accomplished if Mr Christopher comes to the Middle East once every few months, visits Damascus and Jerusalem, and then returns home."

But in Israel, it is known with certainty: Christopher will not stay here, in any case, for an extended period of time, to get an agreement. He does not like being gone from Washington for extended periods of time, where he has a network of contacts as a lawyer, cabinet member, and presidential adviser. "This is an exaggeration," respond those close to the secretary of state. "Anyone who thinks that, if Kissinger had been here, peace with Syria would have taken place a long time ago is wrong. There is an attempt by Christopher and his team to aid and assist in the region's peace process, but, on the other hand, the Americans do not want to get up hopes and fail afterward. In this phase, their assessment is that the situation is not ripe enough for this type of investment, which could end as a big embarrassment for America. If they go toward something very drastic and they fail, this has a harsh significance."

True, it is acknowledged in the foreign ministry and the office of the prime minister, bringing someone like

Yitzhaq Sa'ir to Madrid was considered a significant achievement by Baker. Baker knew how to brutally translate the pressure of a superpower into pressure and to implant a threatening sensation. But conditions have changed. Christopher cannot threaten Peres and Rabin, because the alternative is much worse.

The criticism being heard in political circles in Israel is not only restricted to Christopher, but also includes the team that is working with him. On the team are familiar faces from Baker's days, like Dennis Ross, Aaron Miller, and Dan Kurtzer, to whom Bob Pelletreau and Martin Indyk were added. "They are fed up with the Arabs and Israelis," says a senior political source in Jerusalem. "They have been coming here for years, and the only thing that they got to see was the Oslo accord, in which they were not even involved. This team is weary. Shamir finished them with the definitions of who could sit on the Palestinian delegation. More than having them bring up their own ideas, they expect us to give them ideas and pass them on."

Is it possible to conclude from this that Christopher and his people are not interested in essentially scoring a victory here? Ambassador Itamar Rabinowitz thinks that there is no stipulated link between Christopher's success in the Syrian sector and his remaining secretary of state. Christopher, in his opinion, wants an achievement because he has invested a lot of effort in this; and the man who makes peace between Israel and Syria will earn a lot of praise in the end. The ground-breaking in the upcoming months will help Christopher strengthen his hand toward the judgment day that is anticipated in November.

Israeli Pilots Compare MiG-29 to F-15, F-16

94AA0090B Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR
in Hebrew Jun 94 pp 24-27

[Article by A. Govrin and D. Sela: "First Publication: Four Air Force Pilots Flew in a MiG-29"—first paragraph is BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR introduction]

[Text] Six months ago, four Israeli pilots flew in a MiG-29, the most advanced combat aircraft in Arab countries: Brigadier General D., an air squadron leader, and three lieutenant colonels, two of them squadron commanders. The flight took place at a military base in one of the East European countries. The conclusions of the three lieutenant colonels were definite. In their opinion, only a very highly skilled pilot would be able to bring down another aircraft with the MiG-29. In contrast, Brig. Gen. D. was more forgiving: "A good pilot, who knows the aircraft, has trained in it and has confidence in it could get a lot out of it. The MiG-29 is easy to fly, maneuvers well, is energetic, responds well, and is properly equipped. It has excellent radar, a very advanced detection system that enables interception without radar, and its throttle is better than that of the F-16. In certain aspects, it is, indeed, situated between the previous generation and the current generation,

something between the Phantom and the F-16, but from the aspect of aerodynamic operations, for example, it can definitely be included with the F-16 and F-15 types of aircraft. We have a clear advantage over it, but if we are forced to contend with it, it is liable to constitute a certain amount of risk. Even against an F-16." Interesting data that was verified in the flight: The MiG-29 is not capable of flying long distances or participating in lengthy air battles.

"The MiG-29 is definitely a quality aircraft that could constitute a threat to air force aircraft, but from my personal impressions, in a confrontation between it and Israeli aircraft, we have a clear advantage." This is the conclusion of an air squadron leader, Brig. Gen. D., who, a few months ago, flew in a MiG-29, the Eastern Bloc's leading interception aircraft.

The MiG-29 is considered the most advanced combat aircraft in the Syrian, Iraqi, and Iranian air forces. Ever since it was purchased by Arab countries, the air force has been very interested in it and wanted to get to know the aircraft up close.

In November 1993, an air force delegation, under the auspices of Brig. Gen. D., visited the air force of an East European country, in which MiG-29s are stationed. The delegation included, in addition to the air squadron leader, Lieutenant Colonel N. and Lt. Col. R., two squadron commanders, and Lt. Col. 'A., branch head in the Fighting Means Department.

The delegation executed out four flights in the MiG-29. All were executed in the morning hours, and in an identical format: Each flight lasted 20 minutes, at a temperature of less than zero degrees. The flights included take-off, an altitude climb in a half-loop, executing turns at low and high speeds, horizontal and vertical aerobatics and tactical exercises with the ignition on and with a dry engine. [sentence as published] The flight profile was written by the hosts, who were interested in emphasizing the aircraft's good maneuverability.

The four Israeli pilots flew in the MiG-29's two-seat model, with a local pilot occupying the front seat. "In the front seat of my aircraft was a pilot with the rank of colonel, whose job was equivalent to head of the operations department or head of the training department in the Israeli air force," recounts Lt. Col. D. "Because he had great difficulty with English, we decided to try to have contact with each other through single words in English. Before the flight, we determined, through an interpreter and hand movements, a number of key words through which we would hold a basic conversation regarding who takes the plane and when.

"The aircraft were arranged in a line in an open area. The MiG-29's cockpit was covered with switches, all of them written in Russian, and my first impression was that this was a very cumbersome system. There were too many switches, and my impression, based on looking

inside the cockpit, was that the MiG-29 was situated between the previous generation and the current generation, something between the Phantom and the F-16.

"I was surprised by the speed in which the aircraft took off in flight. Apparently, the MiG-29 is built for operation on short revolutions. [sentence as published] The start-up and electrical supply process is very rapid and is executed by a special service vehicle, which enables the MiG-29 squadron to essentially spread everywhere."

The four Israeli pilots flew two MiG-29 aircraft in a row. The conclusions of the three lieutenant colonels were different from that of Brig. Gen. D.: "In contrast to me, they were very disappointed by the aircraft's avionics. Their evaluation was that only a very highly skilled pilot could bring down another aircraft with the MiG-29. In my opinion, this is an exaggerated impression resulting from the fact that our familiarity with the aircraft was superficial. The MiG-29 pilots, who are familiar with the aircraft, train in it, and are confident in it can get a lot out of it, just as the Israeli Phantom pilots acted in their aircraft: They attacked with them, brought down aircraft with them, and through close familiarity with the aircraft, they extracted its maximum potential. From this aspect, our flight in the MiG-29 was a little misleading, since we essentially flew an unfamiliar aircraft."

The main difference between the advanced, Western combat aircraft and the MiG-29, says Lt. Col. D., is in the avionics. The avionics of the MiG-29 is built on the world perception of the eastern air forces, which grant the pilot a restricted area of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the MiG-29 has excellent radar, but the aircraft does not have a good radar A-scope that would show the pilot all of the data. The radar data are presented only partially, on the upper display.

"Essentially," says Lt. Col. D., "the MiG-29 has all of the systems that enable a pilot to find one's way in air space and locate targets, but the cockpit does not have the appropriate displays to transmit the data to the pilot in a clear fashion."

In addition to the superior radar, the MiG-29 is equipped with a complete infrared detection system for radar, enabling interception without radar. "I do not know at what frequencies the pilots operate this system during their daily training," says Lt. Col. D., "but, doubtlessly, the system's developers installed an advanced approach, where the aircraft intercepts without radar."

The MiG-29 partially integrated the HOTAS (Hands on Throttle and Stick) concept. Part of the switches were moved to the two main handles, but, in order to operate the aircraft's weapons system, many switches must be operated. The impression of the four Israeli pilots was that the cockpit operation was awkward, and that a great deal of dexterity was needed to get a solid performance out of the aircraft.

"In the past, I saw the MiG-23, and I was badly impressed by its poor human engineering," says Lt. Colonel D. "It is recognized that, in the MiG-29, a bit more thought was invested in this area. The MiG's throttle, for example, is made, from its human engineering aspect, in a better way than the F-16's throttle. The throttle has a straight gear, which maintains a continuous line, in contrast to the F-16's throttle, which moves in a semicircular movement. Even with regard to the field of vision, the MiG-29 is built with the grasp of an advanced aircraft. The cockpit is a sort of bubble, seemingly enabling the pilot to see 360 degrees; but the pilot sits low and ruins part of the picture."

From the aspect of aerodynamic operations, Lt. Col. D puts the MiG-29 in the F-16 and F-15 class of aircraft. "My impression was that the MiG-29 is an aircraft that is easy to fly, despite the fact that there is difficulty in operating it at a low speed. The host pilots were well aware of this problem, and, therefore, tried not to get the aircraft into situations in which the speed decreased. Each time I decreased the speed, the local pilot signaled me to increase it. But in the range of normal speeds, the MiG-29 behaves just like an F-16. It maneuvers well, is energetic, and responds well."

Lt. Col. D.'s impression is that the aircraft is well-equipped. It has a sight-camera, has the capability to carry air-to-ground ordnance, and has superior radar to adapt to air-to-ground. The MiG-29 is equipped with electronic fighting means systems, chaff and fire, an all-inclusive warning system, and it carries a 30-mm gun, which, according to the amount of ammunition, could shoot for five seconds straight. [sentence as published]

"One of the nicer aspects of the aircraft is its landing capability," says Lt. Col. D. "It simply makes a natural, smooth landing. The MiG-29's engines are very effective at low altitude, and it responds to all of the pilot's demands. The aircraft is equipped with good shock absorbers, and it is therefore possible to land very smoothly."

Lt. Col. D.'s impression is that a great deal of thought also went into the aircraft's maintenance. On the intakes, there are screen doors that open during take-off, close during landing, and prevent the entry of foreign bodies into the engine. The good maintenance is also demonstrated by preventing the tires from rubbing. Despite the fact that the MiG-29 has an excellent braking system and it can land at low speeds, the airplane is stopped by means of a parachute, so that the tires will not rub as a result of increased use.

"As a pilot who is primarily familiar with American aircraft," says Lt. Col. D., "it was strange to discover completely different approaches. For example, the MiG-29's braking system is operated by a handle placed on the stick, and not by pressure on the pedal, as is customary in all of the Western aircraft. The numerical data are written in kilometers and meters, in contrast to the Western aircraft, in which miles and feet are used. And

even the structure of the helmet is different, and the microphone is not placed inside the mask, but is attached around the neck and is operated by the vibrations of the vocal chords. Even the flight equipment, itself—the overalls and the G-suit—is cumbersome compared to ours, due, among other reasons, to the low temperature in the region, which forces the pilots to wear double flight suits, and their weight creates a heavy, loaded sensation."

An interesting piece of data verified in the course of flight was the MiG-29's fuel requirements. "We knew that the amount of fuel was a problematic point and that the MiG-29 is not capable of participating in an extended air battle or of flying for long distances," says Lt. Col. D. "The MiG-29 has the capability of flying with a [?belly fuel reservoir], but even in a flight with a belly fuel reservoir the amount of the MiG-29's fuel is low. I did not see aircraft there with wing fuel reservoirs."

The flight in the MiG-29 made it possible for Lt. Col. D to be exposed to the daily routine of elite flight in the East European air forces. "The MiG-29 pilots, who are the best pilots in the eastern air forces are relatively experienced, and their average age is around 35. They made a good impression on us, and it appeared that they were considerably professional. They did not know many details about the Israeli air force, except for the fact that it was a good force."

"Like all air forces in the world, they, too, suffer from budget problems, and this is expressed in the number of flights that they execute. From the aspect of grasping safety, I think that we are more advanced than they are. They fly aerobatics at heights and in places that we have not been doing for years."

"Without a doubt, the flight in the MiG-29 was an experience," says Lt. Col. D. "Over the years, I heard more than a little about the MiG-29, and, suddenly, I am in one. I wanted to fly in this aircraft very much, and after the flight, I felt as if I had put all of my prior sensations and assumptions in the appropriate proportions. In my opinion, for years, we tended to glorify the MiG-29's capabilities."

"True, the MiG-29 cannot reach the region of Israel from Iraq and Iran, but it definitely could constitute a risk to an Israeli aircraft that would try to reach those same countries. Even if the MiG-29 pilot did not know how to take maximum advantage of his weapons systems, he would be capable of maneuvering and reaching a position to fire, even if an F-16 pilot were opposite him."

"If we ever need to contend with the MiG-29," says Lt. Col. D., "it would be preferable to do so in Western aircraft. That was the sensation of the four of us before the flight, and it was further strengthened following it."

[Box, p 26]

MiG-29 in Syria, Iran, and Iraq

Planning for the MiG-29 began in 1972, as a replacement aircraft for MiG models 21 and 23 and the Sukhoi

aircraft models 15 and 17. The first prototype of the aircraft took off for the first time in October 1977, but due to the crashes of two prototypes and radical changes in planning, the regular production of the aircraft was postponed until 1982, and only in early 1985 was it declared operational.

The MiG-29 is famous in a large number of eastern air forces. The air forces and navies of Commonwealth countries operate more than 600 aircraft; the air forces of eastern European countries have, on average, about 20 aircraft apiece. Similarly, the Cuban and North Korean Air Forces, the Indian Air Force, and the German Air Force fly the MiG-29.

Only three countries in the Middle East operate the aircraft. Syria purchased it first, in 1987, and, later, it was absorbed into the Iraqi Air Force and the Iranian Air Force.

Syria has two MiG-29 models. A one-seater, used for interception missions, and a two-seater, used for training. According to foreign sources, Syria is interested

in purchasing additional aircraft, on the condition that the agreements for spreading out the debt enable them to make this purchase.

Even in the Iranian Air Force, MiG-29s are operating, having been purchased in the framework of a large transaction with Russia. With the completion of the transaction, the Iranian Air Force is expected to incorporate dozens of MiG-29 aircraft, among them four aircraft that were smuggled from Iraq to Iran during the Gulf war, and that, apparently, have been placed in operational service.

The Iraqi Air Force also equipped itself with one-seat and two-seat MiG-29 aircraft before the Gulf war. During the Gulf war, a number of Iraqi MiG-29s were brought down, and many others were damaged by bombs while still on the ground. According to foreign publications, despite the damage sustained by the Iraqi MiG-29, Iraq has enough aircraft for at least one squadron of MiG-29 aircraft. [end box]

INDIA

Reception of Pakistani TV Broadcasts Regretted

94AS0347A Jaipur RAJASTHAN PATRIKA in Hindi
29 Jun 94 p 8

[Editorial: "Pakistani Television"]

[Text] Information ministers of Rajasthan and other states have expressed their anger at the propaganda spread by the Pakistani television. In the state information ministers' conference in Delhi, they emphasized starting retaliation against Pakistani television propaganda. This indicates how much concern there is over the false propaganda carried out by Pakistan. One important aspect of the state information ministers' reaction was that while they expressed concern over Pakistani television broadcasts, foreign television broadcasts were not viewed with similar concern. The question of forming a policy to thwart the airwaves attack was raised. However, the possibility of banning these programs was totally rejected. Many countries have banned similar programs, but India decided not to follow that policy. The major reason for this is that India is a democratic country and exchange of views and opinions are not thwarted in a democracy. Although pure consumerism, emphasized abroad, is not a priority in our country, the policy of free expression and not banning programs is still being practiced. There is no indication of a change in this policy in the future. Still, the case of Pakistani television is unique. Other foreign television programs do not make anti-India propaganda their goal. Pakistani television programs have only this goal and their anti-India tirade reaches a ridiculous level. The information ministers of the states that share the border with Pakistan have mentioned the dangerous effects of poison spewed out by the television. Pakistani television uses all kind of lies for its campaign against India. It uses venerable adjectives when talking about the terrorists that are killing helpless citizens and does not miss the opportunity to call the Indian soldiers stationed there to protect the citizens invaders. It airs its shameful anti-India programs during the periods when televisions are turned on in most households. One suggestion made during the information ministers conference was to have Doordarshan present more attractive programs during the time when Pakistan carries out anti-India propaganda on the television. This however, this will not resolve the issue fully. The propaganda in newspapers is unmistakable. However, there are many indirect means that the Pakistan television uses for its propaganda. Doordarshan should also pay attention to this. We cannot expect [Doordarshan] to start an anti-Pakistan propaganda campaign emulating the anti-India propaganda carried out by Pakistani television, but [Doordarshan] should retaliate against the anti-India campaign by presenting the facts about the issues that Pakistani television misrepresents in its anti-India campaign.

The most important thing is to make sure that Doordarshan programs are accessible to the people. Because of

the weak and limited number of transmitters, border area residents cannot get clear transmission. After having a network of transmitters all over the country, lack of adequate transmission in border areas is a cause of concern. One reason for this is the scattered population in some border areas. However, even in well-populated areas like Jaisalmer and Sri Ganganagar, which are near the border, reception of Doordarshan programs is not very clear. In such a situation, the local residents are forced to watch whatever shows up on the screen. We cannot blame them for it. It is imperative that this situation is changed without any delay. In this context, a suggestion made by Mrs. Narender Kanwar, Rajasthan's information minister, to install powerful television transmitters in border areas is very logical. These transmitters should be so powerful that they should be able to transmit not only in areas within the Indian border but also in Pakistan. Pakistan has installed a transmitter in Lahore that transmits television programs as far as the villages and towns surrounding Sri Ganganagar. The local residents here have to depend on special antennae and [satellite] disks to receive Doordarshan programs. Smaller transmitters have been installed at some places to transmit Doordarshan programs, however, they have very limited reach. Their transmission is not clear even from 20-25 kilometers away. Narender Kanwar has asked in the information ministers conference that the transmitters being erected at Jaisalmer and Badmer be completed soon and additional transmitters at Anupgarh, Jodhpur, Ajmer, and Udaipur be erected as soon as possible. These transmitters can be fully effective only if they are powerful. It should not be difficult for Doordarshan to respond to Pakistani television effectively while preserving our traditions, healthy democracy, and open government.

Commercial Relations With Bangladesh Said Undeveloped

94AS0369C Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA
in Bengali 11 Jul 94 p 4

[Editorial: "Indo-Bangladesh Relations"]

[Text] Following Commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee, Finance Minister Manmohan Singh is now going to Dhaka. Of course, he is not merely going for a trip to Bangladesh, the official objective of this visit is the meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC]. It does not appear that there will be any special discussion on how the 2-day meeting of the SAARC finance and planning ministers will be advantageous to the mutual cooperation of the member nations in bringing about the economic development of the region. Heretofore, the magnitude of the SAARC success was practically zero. If the wheel of mute history starts rolling after this meeting, then it will be encouraging. But until now this has remained only a hope. Therefore for the time being, so to speak, the main attraction of Manmohan Singh's Dhaka trip is the bilateral economic relations between India and Bangladesh.

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Only at the the end of the seven nation meeting will Manmohan Singh sit with the minsters of the Bangladesh government to discuss bilateral relations. The possibility of developing economic ties between these two countries is as great as the obstacles that have appeared so far with the same intensity. The economic contacts between these two neighboring states have thus far remained limited to an absolutely insignificant level. If trade is the main basis of relations—what else could it be if not trade—then the statistics of trade tell how unsuccessful is that picture. Compared to the figure of the Indian exports, the imports from Bangladesh is negligible. In fact, the two figures do not come under any ratio, or in other words, for India the whole amount of this foreign trade is surplus. In monetary figures the size of this surplus is about 13 billion rupees. It is surely difficult to build a healthy constructive relations with such unusual imbalance! Therefore, in front of Manmohan Singh lies a rough path.

The logic of the economic policy is not inaccessible to the Indian finance minister. He knows pretty well what is required for the genuine development of the Indo-Bangladesh economic relations. Needed are economic projects with the joint efforts of the industrialists of the two countries which will be useful to both of them, and the scope for setting up such projects. At present the industry on which the talks have somewhat progressed is the Sagardighi Thermol Power Project. The natural gas of Bangladesh would be specially utilized as fuel for this project. On this issue the Bangladesh government has recently held some talks with the chamber of commerce of West Bengal and a favorable signal was received. With the purpose of continuing the talks the representatives of the chamber of commerce are again going to Dhaka at the request of the West Bengal Power Minister. An arrangement for the supply of power instead of gas can easily be worked out and that will not only be a distinct gain for both nations, but such kind of projects could also bring new dimensions to the bilateral relations and build the foundation of a long-term economic cooperation. The task of Manmohan Singh and his colleagues will be to create the field of cooperation by holding necessary talks on this issue and at the same time to expand the possibilities of further cooperation and strive for their satisfactory implementation. Many possibilities exist, such as a Dhaka-Calcutta highway link and special facilities for Indian ships at Chittagong Port. The Delhi external affairs ministry is fully conversant with these possibilities. There is no shortage of knowledge of facts in the treasury of the government of India.

The shortage that exists is that of initiative and attitudes. Compared to the importance of India in the eyes of the United States, the importance of Bangladesh in the eyes of the Delhi high commands is probably not great. The kind of cordiality and positive attitude for holding face to face discussions that is required to build a good relation with neighbors, is not always noticed in India's action toward Bangladesh and for that matter the responsibility partly goes to the politicians and partly to

the bureaucrats. In the bilateral relations the differences of weight between the big and small nations are always crudely manifested. One of the biggest alibis is the Ganges water. This issue has created such tremendous impediments in Indo-Bangladesh bilateral understanding, that finding of any acceptable solution to both parties in this matter would make it possible to advance to an unprecedented level. There is no doubt that the problem is complex, but so far enough enthusiasm has not been shown for its solution. In this matter India has more responsibility because the distribution of the Ganges water is under its control. In fact, along with the finding of a solution, sincere efforts must be made to discover an equally important formula for it. On the other side, the responsibility of Bangladesh is not less. Unfortunately, in that country there is a cheap popularity of words and deeds against India. Unless Bangladesh can free its economy from mischievous politics it will not only fail in building good relations with India, but also jeopardize its own interest in long-term economic development. If due to Manmohan Singh's this trip both sides can remove at least to some extent their own political misconceptions and lack of farsightedness, then it will be a big event in the history of bilateral relations. Otherwise, with the return of the finance minister the relation will also revert to the status quo.

'Indianization' of Democracy Seen Crying Need

94AS0347B Jaipur RAJASTHAN PATRIKA in Hindi
23 Jun 94 p 8

[Article by Dr. M. Sharma: "It is Essential to Indianize Western-Style Democracy"]

[Text] We cannot ignore any issues such as building a Ram temple, Kashmir, election reform, swadeshi, social justice, ignoring casteism, and giving importance to religion. These issues play an important role in improving our social system and are equally important in our economic progress and efforts to eradicate corruption. One political party or another has made each of these topics its main issue. Such a situation is ideal for any dynamic social system. A society always finds a leader for every issue and these issues find their own place in the list of various issues. One quality of a democratic system is that every issue gets some sustained by the society. Even contradictory issues manage to exist unresolved.

Abuse of Issues

The Indian democracy is an efficient and healthy democracy. Every leader with a specific issue complains that important issues are being neglected and unimportant issues are getting the attention of the people. This complaint is an indicator of a healthy democracy. The alleged priority issue does not influence the society by itself, and if it does at some time, the other issues help control and balance it. This process bring the issue riding a wave to the ground again. Every issue has the right to

become a mainstream issue, therefore, issues come forward or retreat in turn. The sociology of democracy moves forward with all the issues. Therefore, the most important element is the democracy itself.

Democracy is governed by power of the people and leadership. The power of the people shows its identity at the time of vote and the leadership expresses itself through various political parties. When we need to check the health of the democracy, we have to examine these two elements. The more serious, honest, and rational the people and the leaders are, the more fair the issue will be in the society. The more apathetic and ignorant are the people about the issues, the more dishonest and irrational the leadership will be.

The Indian leadership today is less faithful to the issues at hand; it uses the issues to satisfy its hunger for position and power. The way the leadership uses the issues now does not help increase rationality in the society. Leaders implement the issues without any logic and by inciting emotions. Every issue helps vested interests of one or the other segment of the society. When issues are not logical, these become representatives of the petty struggles of vested interests. In any society, inciting vested interests and using issues for grabbing power by the leaders distort the democratic social process. Have not we become victims of such distortion now?

Leaders become irresponsible when they are not serious about implementing their goals in the society. Instead of following those issues, these leaders use them to build their vote bank. They hope that about 30 percent of the people vote for them because of these specific issues. They use such language of intolerance and hatred toward the remaining 70 percent. Cracks of hatred are created in the social system while their vote bank is strengthened. This results in violence, fights, and riots. Violence and fighting are never justifiable for any issue; these only widen the cracks in the social system. That is why leaders desire violence in order to strengthen their vote banks. Such leaders are not part of the society. They make themselves charismatic using propaganda. They use shameless vocabulary to incite a specific group. These leaders, in order to get attention of a specific group, became a major danger to the society. They consider breaking the law an act of bravery. When some action is taken against them for breaking the law, their supporters start violence and riots. This further strengthens their criminal politics and the government appears to be helpless against them. As a result, bureaucracy also becomes irresponsible and exploits the people. The concept of law and administration becomes crippled.

Relationship With Life

The issues mentioned above, despite their importance, are usually imaginary. The leaders supporting these issues are not found in common dwellings; they show up only in rallies and make plans to keep showing up in newspapers. One result of this has been a political

vacuum in areas where the common people live. Political activities are seen in these areas only during elections. The issues related to problems of daily life are becoming unimportant to political parties now. As a result, a tradition of political leadership has emerged that does not correlate with the society. The political leaders do not think it as important to relate to the society as to relate to the higher echelon leaders. Thus, when there is a crisis, no leader is seen in the areas where people live while the young leaders surround the major leaders in the capital. After all, it will be the blessing of these major leaders, and not activities among the people, that will help you get an election ticket. Thus, even political parties have become property of the vote banks. Our leaders are becoming the new version of landlords. The irresponsibility and corruption that is seen at the higher levels in our country now has resulted from the irresponsibility and corruption of the upper-level leaders. The irresponsibility and corruption that are seen at the lower level have resulted from the overflow from above and the political vacuum at the lower level. The political leadership at the village council, municipal committee, and district level that could inspire the people is missing now.

Because of this situation at the party level, the leaders that emerge because of actions at the lower level are independent. They are apathetic to national issues. When these leaders grow in stature, they get heavily involved in moving from one party to another because their commitment is not to any issues or ideologies, but to gain power and position. They have no problem in giving up their colors. These leaders do not play any special role at the legislative level.

All these developments create a new equation. The leaders who are associated with the people are independent and are without any party allegiance, therefore, cut off from national issues. The leaders have to form coalitions with the lower-level non-aligned leaders. Ideologies, principles, and ideals fall apart in such a situation. Every leader finds himself helpless. He has made some compromises that has weakened his moral strength. In order to exist, he has to either find a party position, a government position, or legislative membership. He cannot exist without one of these three. All in all, in the present situation, it is more important for a leader to protect his existence than to serve the nation.

Self-Analysis Needed

It does not mean that an unusually gloomy situation has emerged for the Indian democracy. Despite all the corruption and immorality, the society never is fully bereft of idealistic and rational living. Our situation is not really extremely bad. We still have people on our political easel who had learned from Mahatma Gandhi, and people who were energized by their association with Acharya Narendra Dev and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia. There are people who consider Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherji and Pandit Dindayal Upadhyay as their idols

and are serious about them. Those who became leaders by associating with Loknayak Jayaprakash Narayan are still important in our politics.

The names of these great men are indeed misused in politics, however, there is such strength of morality and idealism in the lives of these great men that it can still stop people from going wayward and force them to be rational. These historical leaders become direct sources of inspiration to the energetic and idealist youth and there is no need for any medium. Gandhi, Lohia, and Dindayal are alive on the strength of their actions and literature, and not because of their position in a party or government. The parties and government tried to belittle them also. However, it is not easy to lower a great person. Their lives will always give strength to the Indian democracy the same way it is giving now.

Freedom of thought and the election process have their own social strength and a democracy will not die as long as these exist. Some attacks have started on these processes now. Incidence of censure on the ideas of dissidents and freedom of expression have increased in our political life. The tendency to postpone elections in areas that want self-rule or make excuses about difficulties in administration is on the rise. Therefore, this situation calls for self-analysis.

Indianization of Democracy

Despite all its flaws, Indian society is an old society and it has deep roots. The poison insects on the branches and leaves of this banyan tree cannot reach the roots. India is alive not on the strength of our leaders and governments, but on its individualistic personality. We have to strengthen the equation of people's power and leadership. Now that we see some flaws in our leadership, we must strengthen the power of the people.

It appears to the people that political parties and their leaders not involved in elections are outside politics. The public policy of public education, gathering of the people, traditions, and policy should be the politics of democracy. Parties and elections are the body of a democracy and democracy cannot exist without them. However, public education and traditions are the soul of the democracy. Even when India did not have a body for democracy, the government was not as merciless, barbaric, and autocratic as was the case in Europe and other countries. India has never accepted the decisiveness of royal power. The leaders of public education and public action have been more influential than any king here. That is why Surdas, Tulsidas, Mira, Guru Ramdas, and Maharishi Kampan are our heroes even today. Western thought has damaged the religious strength of our society to some extent. We have to Indianize this democracy that came from the West.

Dissatisfaction Within BSP Said Growing

SP Hand Evident

94AS0350A New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 26 Jun 94 pp 1 7

[Text] The conflict within the Bahujan Samaj Party [BSP] is now causing a confrontation with the

Samajwadi Party [SP]. The leader of the BSP legislative party and State Panchayat minister Ramlakhan Verma charged today that some SP leaders are trying to split the BSP. He said that two SP ministers, Beni Prasad Verma and Balram Yadav are fanning discontent in order to break up the BSP. The BSP legislative party leader also said that although he would like the government to last five years, people like Mr. Verma and Mr. Yadav wish to overthrow the government. Meanwhile rebel BSP leader Masood Ahmed has challenged Mayavati to bring about the fall of the government if she can. Mr. Masood claimed that Mayavati will quickly learn where she stands if she announces withdrawal of support from the government because if the BSP leadership makes this mistake then all the BSP legislators will side with Mulayam Singh Yadav.

Yesterday Mayavati had warned Mulayam Singh Yadav in Delhi that he would have to pay a high price if his party tried to split the BSP. Masood responded to Mayavati's warning today. He said, "Let Mayavati issue orders to withdraw support from the government. Not one legislator will be with her." Mr. Masood said that the real reason for discontent within the BSP was Mayavati's statement that she would have the Mulayam government fall within three months. Mr. Masood admitted that "Mulayam Singh is more worried than him about Mayavati, since if it were up to Mayavati the government would already have fallen."

From the statements of BSP's legislative party leader Ram Lakhan Verma that SP members wish to split the BSP, it is clear who is behind BSP's present crisis. The State's Panchayat Rajya minister said that Public Works minister Beni Prasad Verma is continually meeting with BSP's discontented leaders and inciting them. As an example Ramlakhan Verma related that on June 16, that is before his resignation, Beni Prasad Verma invited Masood Ahmed to his house and directly proposed that if his people were dissatisfied with the leadership they should join the SP along with all other discontented members. Disclosing this, the BSP legislative party leader Ramlakhan Verma said that his legislator Barkhu Ram Verma, who was present in Beni Prasad Verma's bedroom during this incident, was eyewitness to this conversation. Ramlakhan Verma said that Babu Ram complained to Kanshiram the very next day about this incident. That is why he not only asked Mr. Masood to resign, but also demanded that Mulayam Singh take action against Beni Verma.

Ramlakhan Verma alleged that Beni Prasad Verma worked to create a rift between the BSP and the SP during the legislative assembly elections as well. Even at that time he created an anti-Mayavati atmosphere. Ramlakhan Verma also said that he could do away with him even in Barabanki if he tried to split the BSP. He said that the same role had also been played by Health minister Balram Yadav. His intention with respect to BSP was not good either. Regarding Mayavati's statement that if attempts were made to split the BSP she

would remove Mulayam Singh from power, BSP leader Ramlakhan Verma said that this did not at all imply withdrawal of support. Someone else would be Chief Minister and the government would still stand.

Meanwhile Mr. Masood says regarding the possibilities of a split in the BSP, "The way things are going, and if Mayavati's activities are not curbed, the party will not only split, it will be destroyed." Mr. Masood does not even expect that Kanshiram will be able to restrain Mayavati. Mr. Masood's residence is crowded with BSP resigners and SP leaders. Yesterday SP leader Mukhtar Anees met him. Today many SP leaders from Gonda and Basti came to meet him. Today BSP's Siddharthnagar and Mau district convenors also resigned from their posts.

Mr. Masood today told newspaper reporters that Mayavati and her partner Mulayam Singh Yadav want the government to fall. To this end they had sent the party's state chairman Jang Bahadur Patel to meet the governor two nights ago. But BSP legislators do not want this government to fall. Mayavati will be isolated from party legislators on this issue. Masood says, "Let her decide to withdraw support from the government. Mayavati's standing will become known."

Mr. Masood says, "Next to Kanshi Ram I have made the most sacrifices for the party. Mayavati's contribution to building the party's structure in Uttar Pradesh is not worth a cent. She could not get even one legislator elected from her area. Instead, our votes sent her to the Rajya Sabha. Not only did she go, she also took Jayant Malhotra with her. This is her love for the masses." Masood makes caustic allegations. Meanwhile Shakir Ali, the new education minister replacing Masood, has said that he will have Masood's actions investigated. He will obtain permission from the party leadership and propose this in a meeting of the council of ministers.

Meanwhile the Social Welfare minister Rajbahadur, said to be among the discontented, expressed his displeasure with the party leadership, saying that there was nothing for him to do since Masood Ahmed had said the right thing. For now he will not resign. He also said Masood's resignation has great significance. Rajbahadur said that Mayavati had given orders that he be defeated but now this discussion was useless. Somehow he won the elections. He is personally grateful to Masood Ahmed who canvassed for him several times despite these orders. But ministers such as Sukhdev Rajbhat, Ramkishore Vind and Lal Ji Chauhan did not attend his campaign even though they were in the area.

Resignation Significant

94AS0350B Jaipur RAJASTHAN PATRIKA in Hindi
25 Jun 94 p 10

[Editorial: "Dissatisfaction Within BSP"]

[Text] Mohammed Islam, President of Bahujan Samaj Party's Uttar Pradesh unit tendered his resignation

immediately after the Uttar Pradesh education minister Masood Ahmed resigned from the government. Meanwhile the convener of the party's Delhi unit, Syed Mujibul Hasan, also resigned from his post. The reason for the resignation of these three senior leaders of the Bahujan Samaj Party is their ire at the capricious behavior of the party's senior leaders, especially Mayavati. Therefore these three resignations are very significant in terms of the party's future. It is also not a coincidence that all three leaders who resigned from government and party posts belong to a minority community and they were unhappy. The statements given by Dr. Ahmed after resigning from the post of education minister not only show clearly his bitterness at Mayavati's behavior, but also that he is distressed with the Uttar Pradesh government's attitude towards the interests of Muslims, and believes that the State government is overlooking their welfare.

The Bahujan Samaj Party and the Samajwadi Party gained the opportunity to form a coalition government in Uttar Pradesh but during the last election the public did not openly support this coalition. It appears that the Bahujan Samaj Party leadership has not been able to assimilate this opportunity and its conduct now reeks of political conceit. The behavior of Mayavati is just an excuse. Kanshi Ram is actually responsible for the increasing dissatisfaction among the people and the party because he is unable to fulfil his responsibility of keeping the party together and communal enmity at bay. Mulayam Singh Yadav has started sensing the weakness of this government and the party, but the Bahujan Samaj Party believes that by organizing the Dalits and creating in them enmity towards other classes, the party's grip on power will become stronger. Until the coalition and especially the Bahujan Samaj Party overcomes this illusion, there cannot be communal harmony in Uttar Pradesh. In the absence of harmony a state of conflict and tension will prevail, which cannot be good for any social system. Immediate political gains can be obtained by creating clashes among communities and communities but it is essential to understand the future dangers that can arise from this.

Along with harmony and goodwill among Dalits, it is also in their interest to create a sense of living together with the rest of society. An environment of social balance, of great importance today, cannot be created by reminding them of the history of their oppression and suffering. Political parties will have to think long-term and ensure that their policies do not encourage communalism and sectarianism. Communalism creates dangers for social goodwill and community enmity eventually deeply hurts the welfare of the very communities whose protection political parties wish while building their own vote banks. The party leaders who have resigned and the reasons they have given indicate that these leaders participate in government and political parties only to protect the interests of their own communities—they are not concerned with the general populace. Any political leader must consider the welfare of the entire populace.

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or else politics will become fragmented. Politics based on communalism or sectarianism cannot be good for the nation. The interests of minorities can only be protected if they join the mainstream. Attempts to separate them from the mainstream may yield immediate political gains but in the long term such attempts will not be in the interests of the politicians or the interests of those people for whom the political leaders are striving.

The revolt of these three Muslim leaders of the Bahujan Samaj Party should be a matter of concern for the party's top leadership. It is the responsibility of both Kanshi Ram and Mayawati to modify their conduct in order to maintain unity in the party. They are determined to eliminate communalism but this cannot be achieved by creating communal jealousy. It is important to understand the damage caused by communal and class conflict, or else they themselves will have to pay the price. The internal disunity and strife within the Bahujan Samaj Party will also create dangers for the existence of the coalition government. Mulayam Singh Yadav is responsible for restraining his supporting party. The coalition does not have an absolute majority in the House—it is only stable due to support from the non-BJP opposition. In such a situation internal differences between the two parties could be fatal. The history of political parties is witness to the fact that whenever parties act against fundamental principles and policies for immediate gains, their future becomes constrained. The ongoing affairs of the Bahujan Samaj Party are a warning for both Mulayam Singh Yadav and Kanshiram. Coalitions formed to oppose a specific party do not last long. Such coalitions should obtain the support of the people—they cannot succeed through the support of a particular community.

BSP Leaders Statements Said 'Irresponsible'

94AS0369B Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA
in Bengali 9 Jul 94 p 4

[Editorial: Is The Danger Only for Mulayam?]

[Excerpt] The problem with Kanshi Ram, the Bahujan Samaj Party [BSP] leader, is that even after witnessing the party's success in various fields within a very short time, he has failed or showed reluctance in executing restraint and responsibility in his talk and behavior which is normally expected. For instance, on coming to Calcutta the speeches he delivered at the gatherings of his followers might lead one to believe that in his party's arena the Samajwadi Party [SP] and its leader Mulayam Singh Yadav are its primary opponents. Even though the BSP and the SP are jointly sitting at the helm of power in Uttar Pradesh by crushing the hopes and aspirations of the Bharatiya Janta Party [BJP], Kanshi Ram and Mulayam have separate parties and different programs, there certainly is no doubt about this. But then why make it more evident by openly attacking Mulayam Singh or fortifying the hands of the political opponents in his party? It is erroneous to think that because they

are mutual partners of the ruling party no one should be allowed to criticize the other. Yet to say, "I have put him on his seat and if I feel like it, I will topple him"—this is childish talk. It is not decent—not at all appropriate—in the mouth of a leader like Kanshi Ram. This might induce skepticism and lack of self-confidence in the functioning of the government and in the touchy situation in Uttar Pradesh it will be especially undesirable. It needs to be remembered that however good might have been the outcome of the BSP-SP alliance in the election, the Mulayam government has to depend upon outside support for its survival. The other political parties are naturally active in taking advantage of that weakness. By uttering confusing and inharmonious things, Kanshi Ram might perform flawlessly the task of instigating the opportunists, but in that way the hopes and aspirations of the general masses will not be met. Moreover, his legislators will be tempted to speak out four times more than himself and thereby increase the tendency of uttering irresponsible things. This will finally boomerang on his own party.

Let us take the case of Mayawati, a prominent leader of the party. Without any rhyme or reason she once attacked Mahatma Gandhi. Nobody is above criticism, but it should have some kind of relevancy. Recently the same Mayawati in one of her speeches all of a sudden attacked Muslims by saying that they are traitors. She did not think about the repercussion of that despicable remark. Masud Ahmed, an angry legislator of the party who is currently unhappy with its big and small leaders, played the cassette of that statement in different meetings. As a result, both Kanshi Ram and Mayawati were greatly humiliated. Mulayam Singh Yadav was also very much embarrassed because the SP-BSP alliance got its maximum support from backward classes of the society, Muslims etc... Once the Muslim voters used to show their cordiality to the Congress Party, but at present a large portion of them support Mulayam because of the socialist leader's secular outlook and the record he had in this regard as a former chief minister. Neither he nor his government would ever wish to ruin that support. Mayawati and few others probably think it unimportant if the Muslim votes go astray and Mulayam gets humiliated. This idea is full of stupidity and Mulayam Singh tried to make Kanshi Ram and others understand this simple fact; in whichever corner the hole might be in a boat, all its passengers face danger. BSP leaders believe that with the intention of sidetracking the government's many failures and criticisms, the chief minister is giving superfluous importance to a Mayawati's brief statement. Everything happens in politics, but in this case the BSP leaders should have to agree that Mayawati has done a wrong thing and urgently be required to restrain her. Why only Mayawati, all leaders should show restraint in their statements and also move with calculation! If the support of the oppressed class—which had enabled the ruling alliance to occupy [the administration in] Lucknow—is allowed to wane, then it will weaken the party and imperil the government. [passage omitted]

Congress (I) Weakness in U.P., Bihar Said Continuing

94AS0347C Jalandhar PUNJAB KESARI in Hindi
30 Jun 94 p 6

[Article by A.N. Dar: "Is Congress a Spent Force in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar?"]

[Text] Various parties involved in the recent by-elections had to taste sweet and bitter fruits. One conclusion is that the Congress (I) is very much behind in the most important region of the Hindi heartland where once it was at the top. This region is Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The top echelon of the party used to rely on this region from where about one-fourth of the Lok Sabha candidates were elected. The recent by-elections have shown that the party has not done anything to improve its position there.

It has always been important for any party or leader to control Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in order to control the nation. It is true that Narasimha Rao and his party were not effected by the weak hold of their party here. They were successful without much help from this region. However, the situation got worse after the Babri Masjid was torn down. The BJP had its government here during those days. Mr. Rao would not like the doubts that emerged during that time to resurface now.

It is not enough for the party to be happy just because Lalu Yadav suffered a setback in Vaishali, the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] won only two vidhan sabha seats in Uttar Pradesh [U.P.], and only the Meerut seat for the Lok Sabha. The Congress (I) cannot feel satisfied just because these two parties [BJP and Janata Dal] are hurt. The party has to worry about its own power base. Its situation in both these states has been pitiful and it is in third place here. This is a bitter truth for the party which has the government at the Center.

The question is whether the Congress (I) is in a position to improve its situation before the next general elections. The Congress (I) cannot be happy about its position in the U.P. Vidhan Sabha. There are 177 BJP, 120 Samajwadi Party [SP], and 67 Bahujan Samaj Party [BSP] legislators there with the Congress (I) holding only 28 seats. In the present situation, it cannot hope for much.

The Congress (I) can feel relieved as many problems have risen in the coalition government of BSP and SP in Uttar Pradesh. BSP's leader Kanshi Ram is operating like a "road roller" and his assistant, Mayavati, has become a target of public wrath by tainting the sacred name of [Mahatma] Gandhi. Mulayam Singh Yadav is only showing minor irritation. He cannot do much until he gets full control of the government. The Congress (I) legislators ask what did they gain from endorsing this government? They have endorsed a government that is slinging mud on Mr. Gandhi. The Congress (I) is getting a bad name, but is unable to do any thing. Some Congressites ask why not help topple this government,

but then others say that it would only help the BJP. A third ambitious group is raising this question: Why is not the Congress being given partnership in the government in the present situation? In response to these questions, Mulayam Singh Yadav removed some district commission heads that supported the Congress Party and replaced them with his own party people. He is focusing on eastern Uttar Pradesh which has 40 percent of U.P. Vidhan Sabha seats. He has proposed a major development plan for this region, however, the BJP by winning the Meerut Lok Sabha seat has demonstrated its strength there.

We should not be surprised at the BJP victory, but at the Congress (I) falling flat on its face. This, at a time when Ajit Singh, the Jat leader, has changed his "faith" and joined the Congress (I) and the neighboring legislator Yashpal Singh has also moved the Gujarat votes to the Congress (I). A few days ago, some Congress (I) leaders including Ajit Singh, Jitendar Prasad, and Mira Kumar, had addressed a public meeting in Gangoh village in Saharanpur district. This meeting proved to be very effective, however, the people in the neighborhood did not vote for the Congress (I).

Why is Congress (I)'s situation in Uttar Pradesh so weak? Narayan Dutt Tiwari, a very powerful Congress (I) leader, is not active now. He leaves a strong impression, however, that he is not being given much importance now. He had started a campaign for developmental projects to counter the emergence of caste and religious feelings. However, it was stopped in the middle. The Congress (I) cannot do anything until it finds a leader to challenge the BJP and the BSP-SP coalition.

When Mr. Tiwari attended a RSS [Rashtriya Swayam-sevak Sangh] rally organized in memory of his one-time friend Bhaurao Deoras (brother of former RSS head Balasaheb Deoras), everyone was shocked. If he is so important that the Congress leaders fear this incident, then why is not he given the responsibility of rebuilding the Congress Party in this state? We cannot forget the scary truth included in the Karunakaran report prepared after the defeat in the election that a large state like U.P. was left without a leader and this would lead to frightening prospects for the Congress party.

The situation in Bihar is equally bad. The most representative example of this was the confrontation between various factions during the Congress executive committee's meeting in Talkotra ground. If the irritation between the Jagannath Misra and Ramlakhan Singh Yadav groups was enough for them to fight openly, one can only think that they may have settled their difference in the Vaishali election similarly. The Congress president has assured his taking strict action and it could also mean finding a new president for the state Congress Party. Jagannath Misra is a member of the Rajya Sabha and he should have given up the leadership of the state's parliamentary groups earlier. Why did not Mr. Misra relinquish this position on his own when he was elected

to the Rajya Sabha? His opponents say that the Vaishali election was affected by his not resigning.

He says that he did that because he did not want the Vaishali seat to go to L.P. Shahi who does not belong to his group. This helped the victory of Lovely Anand, the People's Party candidate. The Janata Dal candidate also lost. This is important when talking about Lalu Yadav's future. As for the Congress Party, it looks bad for it coming in the third position because the two pro-Congress groups—Rajputs and landlords—voted for Lovely Anand. Now Mulayam Singh Yadav is trying to get his hands on Bihar and the BJP is thinking about presenting Shatrughna Sinha as the next Bihar chief minister. Does the Congress (I) know what it is doing since all its leaders appear to busy trying to throttle each other?

In the old days of Congress rule, there was reverence and respect for the top leader. What kind of future does the Congress have when we hear a Congress legislator say while referring to an old event in Africa that Mr. Jagannath Misra is playing his own harp like Idi Amin? His opponents say that Misra lost interest in the election when Shahi was not appointed the Congress candidate. The fact is that it was he who had first informed them that the Congress (I) was being badly defeated in Vaishali because he had made this announcement soon after the votes were cast.

The Congress (I) president has to do a lot more than just changing the state party presidents if he wants to have some optimism about this two states. He will have to give new life to the party.

CPI-M Organ Carries Criticism of CPI

94AS0357A Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English
21 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Subrata Sen: "CPI(M) (Communist Party of India-Marxist), CPI (Communist Party of India) Lock Horns Once Again"]

[Text] New Delhi, June 20—In what indicates a dip in relations among the Left parties, the CPI(M) [Communist Party of India-Marxist] has charged that the CPI's [Communist Party of India's] stand on the issue of electoral reforms would only benefit the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party].

In the latest issue of the party organ, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY, the CPI(M) Politburo heavyweight, Mr Prakash Karat, has held the CPI's "misguided" stance responsible for the failure to introduce the Bill.

Incidentally, this is the first time that the CPI(M) has come out directly against the CPI in its party forum. Its criticism, so far, had been thinly veiled and the Politburo, only last week, had said that the CPI had taken an "inexplicable" stand.

Mr Karat's piece is likely to strain CPI-CPI(M) relations at a time when the Left parties are contemplating a joint movement against the Government's economic policies.

Attacking the CPI's stand that the Chief Election Commissioner [CEC] should have primacy in decision-making and the present CEC was popular among the people, Mr Karat said: "Those who advocate the supremacy of the CEC to oppose the Constitution (Amendment) Bill are only reinforcing the present Constitutional dispensation which provides for one individual being the sole decision-maker.

"This means that after the present CEC's tenure is over, the Central Government is free to appoint an individual of its choice and preference. Such a person would not only be pliant but will have all the powers to decide on the electoral process", Mr Karat said.

Mr Karat argued that the central question was not whether the powers of the present CEC should be curbed or not. The issue, he said, was providing for a Constitutional setup, whereby in the future the Congress(I) Government—or any other Government—was not able to foist a pliant individual as an all-powerful CEC.

Reiterating the party stand, Mr Karat said that the CPI(M) was convinced that the two Bills contained many important aspects of electoral reforms: enforcement of certain provisions in the model code of conduct to check malpractices in polls; sanctions against political parties misusing religion; and the setting up of a multi-member Election Commission through a process of judicial consultation.

"Unfortunately, all this has now been stalled", he said.

Meanwhile, the CPI general secretary, Mr Indrajit Gupta, too, has come out in support of his party's decision regarding the poll Bills. His article, published in the latest issue of the party organ NEW-AGE, is likely to add yet another dimensions to the CPI-CPI(M) controversy.

Mr Gupta has alleged that the CPI(M) leadership was ready to support the Bill lock, stock and barrel. He said: "The CPI(M)'s obsession with Seshan's admittedly high-handed and arbitrary behaviour blinded it to the Government's motivated game. It indulged in an unwarranted smear campaign against CPI, which is perfectly entitled to have its own independent stand, which may differ on some points from that of the CPI(M)".

BJP Efforts on Behalf of Jammu Hindus Lauded

Efforts Inevitable

94AS0349A Jalandhar *PUNJAB KESARI* in Hindi
25 Jun 94 p 4

[Editorial: "Why a Movement By BJP"]

[Text] The BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] started a satyagraha [movement] on June 23 to direct the government

and nation's attention to the explosive situation in Doda district. The initiation of this 15 day movement on June 23 was very carefully chosen as it was on this day that Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, while in custody, sacrificed his life in Shrinagar, to negate any roadblocks between Jammu-Kashmir and the remainder of India in order to maintain national solidarity and unison.

On this date Lal Krishna Advani, the leader of the party, spearheaded the first group of the satyagrahis [Those engaged in the movement] and was arrested along with 2000 of his volunteers all of whom were released later. These included four members of the Parliament and 27 other legislators. Stating the objective of this movement, Sri Lal Krishna Advani said that this movement is to vigorously elevate the demand for assertive steps to crush terrorism in Kashmir and to draw the attention toward the seriousness of the situation in Doda district of Jammu region.

As far as the deteriorating situation in Doda is concerned, according to Sri Advani, his party has consistently warned about it for the last three years. Three delegations of powerful central BJP leaders have also visited Doda region and have submitted their findings to the appropriate authorities. Sri Advani himself met with the Prime Minister with other eminent leaders. Newspapers reported the Doda situation, editorials were written, and the issue was also raised in the Parliament. But unless the situation gets out of hand, and a few explosions take place, does our government ever take heed?

The English language has a proverb, "A Stitch in time Saves Nine" i.e. a single timely stitch on a torn cloth saves nine stitches being necessitated later. But it appears that our potentates have vowed never to mend things in a timely fashion. And that is why nothing happened when the BJP raised the Doda issue. Nothing happened when people got murdered. Nothing happened when the newspapers published the horrifying stories on the Doda situation and editorial comments voiced serious concerns. Nothing happened when concern was expressed in the Parliament. Nothing happened when a large scale exodus started from Doda.

At last, when BJP announced a crusade, Sri Ghulam Nabi Azad was despatched to Himachal to explore the plight of the people who had deserted the Doda region. And only after the Doda region was badly engulfed by communalism, enhanced tensions and an increased number of murders, Sri Zaki the counselor to the governor hurriedly left for Doda. Surprisingly, Sri Ghulam Nabi Azad also declared that the Doda people who came to Chamba are ready to return. The fact is, however, that they cannot even think about returning until the shadow of death leaves Doda.

So far the terrorists are free to murder, loot, rape and compel the people to kill their own kin and consume their body parts as food, how can then one dare to return to Doda?

It will not be inappropriate to mention that the terrorists have selected Doda as their center of action simply knowing that the region lacks adequate security. Here some 650 villages are spread in an area of 11,691 kilometers and according to one estimate about 2,000 families have taken refuge in the neighboring province of Himachal. It is note worthy that presently 16 army battalions are stationed in Shrinagar whereas Doda so far has only one battalion in spite of assurances that the region, which is much larger, would have four battalions. In any case, the terror being inflicted upon Doda, and the pain of the inhumane atrocities committed by the terrorists can only be felt by those who have endured it during the partition of the united Punjab. This pain is fully reflected in every word of the book *Rape of Rawalpindi* written by the late Sri Prabodh Chandra. We have also experienced a similar pain during the 12 years of terrorism in the Punjab. We, therefore, understand and feel this pain ourselves.

The emigrants can only hope to return when Doda is under army protection, the security of the people is fully assured, and there is no fear of the loss of personal property, life and prestige.

As far as the BJP's demands are concerned, they are:

1. Section 307 be lifted from Jammu-Kashmir.
2. Doda be declared as a disturbed area.
3. The army be despatched to Doda. In spite of repeated demands only a portion of the promised force has been deployed, and according to the BJP the numbers have not increased but have actually decreased.
4. Ex-army soldiers be provided with weapons.
5. Those patriots willing to cooperate in maintaining law and order be provided with weapons.

It should be pointed out that at the time Doda situation was discussed in the Parliament, Home Minister Sri Shankar Rao Chavan, assured that Doda would get a cantonment and the residents would get weapons for self protection, but nothing has been done to date.

Similarly, Sri Chavan had said that the issue of declaring the region a disturbed area is under consideration. But the government did not pronounce Doda a disturbed area whereas portions of Punch and Rajori have been designated as disturbed areas, and Shrinagar already has such a classification.

It was also said that an aerial survey will be conducted to detect terrorist hide-outs but this resulted in no action. The mental condition of our rulers in the words of a poet is like: "I think, I pledge to do something, but don't act on this; Not knowing the outcome I let it go away."

The central State Minister for Home, Sri Rajesh Pilot, has assured the Parliament that Doda will not become another Shrinagar but according to a BJP Member of

Parliament Sri Krishan Lal Sharma, within a 69 kilometers area in Doda district there is no police station, no policeman or security, and the entire area is ruled by the terrorists. People are streaming toward Chamba, toward Ramvan and are running away from villages to cities. Now, under these conditions let someone tell us that Doda will not become another Shrinagar!

It is also dreadful that during the time of terrorism in Punjab, Sri Krishna Kant who was with the opposition at that time had demanded the sealing of the boundaries but to no avail. Similarly, the BJP had asked in vain for deploying the army in Punjab.

What could be a greater mockery than when the government thinks that it is contrary to the national interest to implement any opposition ideas. Why does it overlook the fact that both the government and opposition are dedicated to a common goal of preserving national interests.

Under these circumstances and in spite of repeatedly raising the Doda issue in the Parliament, and meetings with the Prime Minister, if the Doda region is not declared a disturbed area, the army is not deployed there, weapons are not provided to the residents for self protection, and if the people are compelled to flee from their homes because of terrorism, atrocities, murder and rape, then what other means does the BJP has to focus the public attention on this issue except to undertake a movement and is there any legitimacy to call it wrong?

Internal Friction an Obstacle

94AS0349B New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 28 Jun 94
p 1, 7

[Article by Pradip Singh: "BJP Caught in the Trap of a Satyagraha Over Doda"]

[Excerpts] New Delhi, June 27. BJP's Doda movement has become a victim of an internal power struggle. [passage omitted]

In addition to considering the Kashmir issue, BJP, during its Badodara convention had announced a two month long journey circumscribing the country. It was planned to encompass the country starting July 15 and to complete the journey on September 15. To finalize the detailed party program the central council is meeting on July 8. But the membership of the central council is divided on the issue of Kashmir movement itself. The entire program for the 15 day movement was endorsed in Badodara. The names of respective central leaders chosen to lead the demonstrations on specific days were also announced.

Among the leaders to lead the demonstrators, the name of central Secretary General and Party spokesman Sri Krishna Lal Sharma was missing. Whereas the name of his opponent Secretary General Promod Mahajan was included. To get his name included Sri Sharma had to get the name of Uma Bharti the Member of Parliament and

the President of the party youth group, deleted from the list. This caused arguments between Sri Sharma and Srimata Bharti. Uma Bharti accused Sri Sharma of road blocking her efforts every time she gets a chance to elevate herself. Uma Bharti was nominated to lead the group from Madhya Pradesh. [passage omitted]

Paper Details New Split in Janata Dal

94AS0353A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
22 Jun 94 p 1

[Names as published]

[Text] New Delhi, June 21—For the third time since the June 1991 elections, the Janata Dal split today when 14 of its Lok Sabha M.P.s [members of Parliament]—out of a total of 39—announced that they would sit as a "distinct political group" in the House.

They said that their decision, made last evening, was a "political initiative" to revitalize a party gripped by an "existential crisis of the gravest proportions".

The 14 M.P.s who communicated this to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha were: Mr Yunus Salim, Mr Abdul Ghafoor, Syed Shahabuddin, Mr Rabi Ray, Mr Nitish Kumar, Mr Brishan Patel, Mr Chandrajeet Yadav, Mr Harikishore Singh, Mr Ram Naresh Singh, Mr George Fernandes, Mr Mohan Singh, Mr Mahendra Baitha, Mr Harikewal Prasad and Mr Manjeet Lal.

Addressing a news conference at the residence of the former Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Mr Rabi Ray, the leaders of the breakaway group claimed that they constituted the "real Janata Dal". They said that the party president, Mr S. R. Bommai, had been apprised of the development.

Stating that they were committed to the policies of the original Janata Dal—social justice, secularism and democracy—they said that the split was not a revolt against the leadership of Mr V. P. Singh.

The latter, said Syed Shahabuddin, "would continue to be revered as a patron saint of social justice forces". Their move was against "some vested interests", who were out to subvert the party and were violating its discipline, the leaders said.

These "vested interests" were identified as: Mr Ram Vilas Paswan, Mr Sharad Yadav and the Bihar Chief Minister, Mr Laloo Prasad Yadav. These leaders, incidentally, have claimed that the party has neither a president nor a national executive.

The earlier two splits in the party had taken place when Mr Ajit Singh had formed his own group, the Janata Dal (Ajit), with a strength of 20 MPs. This group split when Mr Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav, who is now the Petroleum Minister in the Union Government, decided to bail out the Congress(I) during the no-trust motion in the Lok Sabha.

When asked who would lead the breakaway group, Mr Nitish Kumar said that would be sorted out in a couple of days. Responding to another question, he said that cooperation of like-minded parties—S.P. [Samajwadi Party] and BSP [Bahujan Samaj Party]—“could not be ruled out”.

The breakaway group claimed that more M.P.s—from both Houses—and MLAs from several States would join it soon. The leaders said that they were planning to call a national convention of their “party” in August.

Reacting to the development, Mr V. P. Singh said at his residence today that what had happened was inevitable. “In fact, I have been anticipating it since January last”, he said.

When asked why had he refused to accept the presidency of the party—and thereby precipitated the crisis—Mr Singh said that leadership was being thrust upon him. “They were trying to plaster the walls without cementing the gaps between the bricks”.

He added that the split would result in cracks in the party's State units in Karnataka, Orissa, Bihar and Maharashtra.

Left Parties Call for 29 Sep General Strike

94AS0356A Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English
22 Jun 94 p 6

[Text] New Delhi, June 21—The Left parties have decided to call a nationwide general strike on September 29, in protest against the Union Government's economic policies and signing of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] agreement.

The decision was made today at a day-long convention of the National Platform of Mass Organizations [NPMO], a forum of Leftist trade unions and mass organizations. The Leftist platform today decided to launch its second phase of anti-GATT agitation.

After the Bharat bandh they will decide on their third phase of agitation.

They have also decided at today's convention that the NPMO will observe a “national protest week” from August 3 to August 9 against the Government's economic policies. Besides this, there will be an all-India *rail roko* agitation on September 20, followed by a country-wide torch-light procession on September 27.

Today's convention condemned the Government for signing what they called the “diabolical” GATT agreement and alleged that it was against national interest. This, they said, provided for unhindered amassing of Indian wealth by multi-national companies.

A resolution, which was adopted today, stated: “Although the massive countrywide protests since the past three years have slowed down the economic

reforms, the Government has refused to reverse them and is going ahead with its anti-national and anti-people policy.”

While alleging that the new economic policies had increased unemployment, both in the urban and rural sector, the declaration also complained that the public sector was being dismantled systematically. There was also an unprecedented hike in prices over the past three years, adding to the problems of the common people, the declaration said.

The resolution further stated: “In the background of deteriorating economic situation and growing offensives on all sections of toiling people, the National Convention calls upon all sections of workers, peasants, agricultural workers, students, youth, women and democratic and patriotic sections of the people to consolidate the unity achieved through the struggles and further intensify united actions by launching countrywide programmes.”

Fundamentalists' Campaign Against Author Viewed

Bangladesh Democracy Threatened

94AS0325A Calcutta *ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA*
in Bengali 19 Jun 94 p 11

[Editorial: “Taslima Is a Huge Question Mark”]

[Text] The present and future of Taslima Nasreen still remains uncertain. For sometime now she has been underground and various types of gossip continue at home and abroad. Even if it is presumed that her letter to the speaker of the parliament from underground sources is genuine, Taslima Nasreen has not yet surrendered to the chief justice of the high court in response to a government appeal. Therefore, concern remained unchanged at home and abroad. The search also continued in various circles to determine whether or not Taslima Nasreen is alive and living in Bangladesh. If it is presumed that she is living underground in Bangladesh itself, then the question arises—why should a writer have to remain underground? Taslima Nasreen is not a murderer nor a bandit nor a drug trafficker so that she has to remain in hiding. She is not a political terrorist with any extreme views, who has to execute political activities from her secret den. Taslima Nasreen is a writer and in her life of 32 years of age, has said everything—whatever she wanted to say—with her pen. It is a misfortune for Bangladesh that a writer had to abandon her pen and paper and spend days at a secret place leaving her hearth and home and that too for the sake of [saving her] life. If truly no trace is finally found of Taslima Nasreen or the hostile forces silence this brave lady forever, then on that day further misfortune will befall on Bangladesh. There is not the slightest sign of pusillanimity or craftiness in the image of Taslima Nasreen that has been built in the minds of innumerable readers. She is adored in different circles as a brave protester and blunt speaker. In spite of

that if she has really gone underground, then it is to be presumed that she has done something against her own nature only because her life is in danger. These feelings of peril were not unreasonable. Of course, there was cause to be alarmed at the noise being raised, and she immediately protested against it in writing. There also were other reasons for Taslima's worries. She had made a demand for her security but did not get any firm consent. In lieu of this, a warrant for her arrest was issued. After this only two ways could remain open in front of a lonely writer with no party affiliation. One, to unconditionally surrender to the government, bowing before the false boasting of the fundamentalists. The second path is to make utmost efforts to keep herself alive as long as, and in whatever way, possible.

Only the Bangladesh government knows what it is going to do with Taslima Nasreen. For the time being, after reviewing the events one thing is obvious: the influence of the fundamentalists is increasing daily in Bangladesh and though the main target of the militant fundamentalists is Taslima Nasreen, the persons—who are thunderously roaring on the streets—have a larger objective. Otherwise, attacks on newspapers could not continue one after the other. When democracy was established in Bangladesh after bringing the end of dictatorship and Begum Khaleda Zia occupied the seat of military ruler Ershad, democrats at home and abroad thought that as a democratic government has come to power in place of a whimsical administration, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and of human rights would be protected and there would be the beginning of rule of law at all levels of the nation. It seems that the fundamentalists were determined to crush that dream and as a result of it a holy war was launched against the non-government relief organizations [NGO], hundreds of school buildings managed by them were set on fire, attempts made to close down the girls schools in the rural areas and Islamic decrees were issued at all places on flimsy grounds. A direct attack continues on the press and on freedom of speech. Begum Zia's government practically remains in the role of a spectator. Even more than this, the government had become a toy in the hands of the fundamentalists. To keep the fundamentalists satisfied this government had arrested and imprisoned journalists who were not even granted bail. Why? Are these people thieves or bandits? Did they put any price on someone's head for auction? However, the other side is doing this type of thing also. A Muslim mullah has offered 100,000 Taka for Taslima Nasreen head. It is amazing that the government has not taken any steps against this butcher even when he has openly calling for murder and the Taslima Nasreen's family had to file a case. The national flag was lowered from the parliament building [by the fundamentalists] before the very eyes of this government. When the government was in search of Taslima Nasreen with the warrant in its hand, the fundamentalists made a new demand: for the country to legalize a blasphemy act. Although this act exists in the law books of some civilized nations of the world as a reminder of the

Middle Ages, report of its application was never heard. Will Bangladesh revert to the Middle Ages after reaching the doorstep of the twentyfirst century? Remaining either visible or invisible Taslima Nasreen has today raised this big question mark before her own nation. Only the democratic patriots of Bangladesh can search for the answer.

Fundamentalists Encouraged

94AS0325B Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA
in Bengali 19 Jun 94 p 11

[Article by Maitreyi Chattopadhyay: "Courage versus Fundamentalism"—all quotation marks as published]

[Text] Fourteen years ago today Salim Alladdin, a popular playwright of Bangladesh, said with aplomb and pride: "No communal riot has taken place in our country after 1964". His assertion got an echo in the speeches of artists Kamrul Hassan and Kalidas Karmakar and in the music of Sanjeeda Khatun—the singer and research scholar on Tagore. On hearing it there was, on one side, a feeling of joy and at the same time also shame because in secular India the minority community suffered damages over and over again in ugly communal riots between 1964 and 1980. But in independent Bangladesh even after the ghastly incidents of Adamji Jute Mill no hostile relations developed between the two communities. This tradition was built up at a slow pace. The language movement of 1952, the agitation against the educational policy and the independence gained after the liberation war are today at the verge of being wasted because of the conspiracy of the fundamentalists. At the root of this ugly fretting and fuming of the fundamentalists that has started circling round the brave and unyielding fighter Taslima Nasreen, lies a statement which was never made.

In an interview with a newspaper in Calcutta Taslima Nasreen made a demand for the amendment to the Shariat [Islamic law] Act. It is a matter of great regret that even though 12 percent of India's population is Muslim and from the numerical side it is the home of the third largest (next to Indonesia and Bangladesh) Muslim population in the world, the educated Indian Hindus are ignorant about the Islamic religious rites. Probably guessing from this ignorance that the Koran and Shariat are synonymous to each other, Taslima's statement was published [in translation] as if she was asking for an amendment to the Koran. Despite correcting the mistake and [THE STATESMAN's] publishing without any change the protest note she supplied, a commotion was built up laying stress on the things that she did not utter.

Since the publication of LAJJA, Taslima has been at the peak of controversy. She said time and again that she had written that novel after feeling agitated and repentant at the attacks on the minority community in Bangladesh in retaliation to the demolition of the Babri mosque [in India]. As per literary standard LAJJA might not be

without any fault, but could its genuineness and importance be denied? The empathy with which young Taslima tried to understand the psychological state of the minorities, is there a drop of it witnessed in this country? How many writers held pen in their hand to write on the events in Bombay, the carnage in Kanpur and mass scale rapes in Surat? Dhobiatala was once also existing here in Calcutta. Besides few newspaper reports how many writings have come out on these issues?

It is said that by not being silent, Taslima has helped fundamentalism. By remaining silent our writers and political parties, for the sake of filling their own voting bags, continue to flatter Muslim fundamentalists and thereby encourage fundamentalism.

Nowhere in Taslima's 32 books was mention made about a change in the Koran. Could an ancient scripture be altered? Could the Vedas [Hindu scriptures] be changed? Although the language of the Bible has been made contemporary and at the demand of the women's movement some clergymen are not referring the God as a male person, whatever was said in the Bible has not been changed. Today's world is so different from the time of Mohammad that the Shariat Act has become obsolete. Has the constitution of India been made on the basis of the Manu Sanghita [Hindu code of laws written by sage Manu]? In the West, (besides the Vatican) there is no individual law based on religion. The laws of marriage, inheritance, guardianship, support of the children, and divorce have been made in accordance with the democratic principles of the constitution. Taslima Nasreen also wants the same thing. It is often heard (also from Leftist sources) that the Koran has given all rights to the women but the Muslim priests are not granting them. But no one has any headache to find out why or how they are not allowing it. Exactly on this point Taslima has opened her mouth. She wants to amend the Shariat Act and have the disparity between man and woman be removed and also asks for a single family act for all religions based not on religion but democratic human values. This was made obvious during a personal talk with her. She also does not change her views all the time and so she right away protests with a polished and restrained language any misinterpretation of her statement.

Unfortunately, this restraint was absent in most of the newspaper reports. While criticizing Taslima it is often said that in reality she is an inflated balloon created by the media. Is it a fact? Hasn't the media engaged itself in a shameless tirades against her. Discarding all civility, a Bengali daily has published one of her handwritten personal letters on the front page. Are rights a one sided affair? While writing on her they impertinently mention time and again her dress, smoking habit and her large number of male friends. Why? All these are malicious attempts to malign her courage and self-esteem. The well-known leftist leaders have also not stayed away from such attempts. In the opinion of Kanak Mukherjee, Taslima's women's movement is 'rustic'. This proletarian leader's superciliousness reference to rusticity

deserves no pardon. Another woman leader in a statement said that at the procession on 8 March Taslima paraded on the streets of Dhaka wearing slacks. We are accustomed to hearing such types of things coming out of the mouth of the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP]. Now it is being noticed that in India all jackals hoot alike on women issues.

An uncivilized report entitled 'Taslima's 20 points' was published in Bengali dailies here. Holding in their hands a business prospect with a bright, spicy side, no newspaper had showed any integrity. The news of Dhaka's insignificant paper was false and erroneous. Despite her protest, soon after the publication of the report, articles and letters attacking her started appearing in the editorial page. Is this an example of honest journalism? In the uncompromising struggle against fundamentalism, Taslima with her own competence, straightforward speeches and clear viewpoint has created a place in the publicity media. But paying no heed to this struggle, the publicity media has embarked on a competition of yellow journalism against her.

The reason for this is that our society is still reluctant to hear or endorse the undaunted voice of any girl. The television and women's organizations of France—which took her there—first collected all her books and discussed them with the help of translators and then conducted a 6 hour long interview with her. Taslima spoke in Bengali and for that reason they brought two Bengali girls from Germany. Over here [Calcutta], on the basis of rumors and without reading her writings, various kinds of opinions are being published.

It is noteworthy that the first attack on Taslima came from India. Shahabuddin (whose compromise with the fundamentalists for the greed of power is well-known) insistently pointed out that by talking about a change in the Koran, Taslima has profoundly hurt the feelings of the devout Muslims and she should not be granted a visa anymore. His eyes noticed only the wrong statement and not her protest and his motives are obvious. The sudden outburst of uproar 3 weeks after the publication of the interview also signals a deep conspiracy. To the West Bengal leftists, the demand for her death sentence has become, for political reasons, a matter of 'Bangladesh's internal affairs'. Fortunately, Mandela or San Suu Kyi were not Muslims, and therefore the Indian Left Front could uphold its own image by loudly speaking against the stealing of democratic rights of these people.

Like the BJP in India, the Bangladesh fundamentalists have very carefully selected Taslima for their own integration. It is noteworthy to notice the uniformity in the programs of these two fundamentalist groups. Today BJP is worried about the security of Taslima. But one and half years ago at the time of the reckless demolition of the mosque they did not think about the Muslims. They were then the 'progeny of Babar' [Moghul King]. The [Bangladesh] government's shameless compromise

to save the administration by patronizing the fundamentalists and co-opted its movement. This had substantially embarrassed the fundamentalists. To capture the winds of their sail, they tried to represent Taslima and her views in a distorted manner.

But the gratification is that in this hurly-burly Taslima was not without any support. Although the Zia government did not answer her protest letter, the organizations of leftists, human rights, women and students stood courageously by her side and all of them were determined to resist the fundamentalist aggression. Without being in any group, lonely Taslima with the might of her pen was not finding herself alone. Like her predecessor Begum Rokeya she was fighting alone. But as her pen gave a big jolt to the horizon of ordinary women, she found their generous support behind her. Her innumerable readers are the source of her strength in both Bengals [West Bengal and Bangladesh] and despite critics this number is slowly increasing. Her undaunted statements have helped and will help the movement. A large number of Muslim intelligentsia in Bangladesh have asked the government for the repeal of the enemy property act. The biggest women's organization in Bangladesh—Mahila Parishad—has made a forceful demand for a single family act. If the Shariat Act could be amended in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and in Khomeni's Iran, then why should it not be done in Bangladesh? By disregarding the indubitableness of Taslima's demands, spokespersons of a few progressive parties have revealed something. In their views Taslima's imprudence has harmed their movement and strengthened the hands of the fundamentalists. This is an irrelevant view because Taslima's unyielding struggle has opened their compromised mask. Because of their silence, a secular constitution is gradually being overturned. If today, Bangladesh turns into a full-fledged religious state, the future won't recognize these so-called progressive elements. Taslima can read the writing on the wall, these people are intentionally posing as if they have not seen it.

Oppression of Women, Writers

94AS0325C Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA
in Bengali 19 Jun 94 p 11

[Article by Sutapa Bhattacharya: "From Rokeya to Taslima Nasreen"—all quotation marks as published]

[Excerpt] Are some changes taking place in the societies around us? Then why do not its effects fall on the use of our language? It seems that after so many days the time has come to make changes in the application of some words. For instance, the adjective 'feminist'—so far this adjective has been used in a negative sense. Today we say that we want to read only the feminist writings. The book that has opened my eyes in this regard is *In Search of Our Mother's Garden* written by Alice Walker. It is a feminist prose book—the cover itself speaks of this and the preface explains what is meant by 'feminist'. That woman is called feminist who loves other women, their

culture, their emotions, even their acts of crying and also simultaneously their strength. Individually, the same woman also loves a man and she is duty bound for the survival and fulfillment of the overall masses without making distinction between a man and a woman. She is not a separatist, she is a universalist.

The person, who first established her identity in Bengali literature as such a feminist woman, was Begum Rokeya Sakhawat Hussain and the most contemporary name that we can take is, of course, Taslima Nasreen. It is to be observed that both of them are members of the Muslim community, yet in India many of us are accustomed to consider the Muslim community as somewhat backward.

In the year 1905 *Sultana's Dream* was published—in that book Rokeya visualized such a feminist-ruled kingdom where the men stayed home and the women went out and worked! Drawing the boundaries of 'male' areas could be one of the ways to keep men out of the sight of women. In this manner, at the beginning of the twentieth century Rokeya could bring a novelty in the application of words. The unbounded love for women was hiding in each and every article of Rokeya. This does not mean that she had any kind of hatred for men. On the contrary, she had repeatedly talked about collective discussions between men and women on the issues of life and knowledge.

Like Jyotirmoyee, Ashapurna and others, some women novelists have samples of the national feminist writings. Although there are many writings on women's affairs outside the sphere of creative writings, I don't see that currently much of such feminist writing could be compared with Taslima's. Several of their writings contained protest against serious social injustices—dowry, killing of wives, unequal wages between male and female laborers, various kinds of economic deprivations, women's image in movies, women's image in poems and novels—and innumerable writings on these issues have continued to appear in the past few years. All of them were by male writers, not feminists and they could not make a crack on any wall of the firm, immovable, sluggish social framework. However, Rokeya's writings also did not whip up any storm because they were published only in magazines like NABA-NUR or MAHILA, whose reading circle was pretty small. We wonder in our mind why Ramananda Chattopadhyaya or Promatha Choudhury [two noted Bengali writers] did not invite her to supply writings. Taslima did not have that difficulty, her writings had shaken up a very large reading community, not merely for the reason of what she said but due to the intensity of her pain. Her construction of a just language for emotionally expressing each of these things—anger toward aggressive persons, tears for the victims, hatred for self-conceited people, despair for absent-minded women—took Taslima's writings to thousands of people in the villages and rural areas. We have heard that after reading her writings many people in the villages learned to think about things which they never could have imagined

before. Similar to her speeches, novels like *LAJJA* and *FERA* also basically were the expression of her human feelings. And she, who is a humanitarian and universalist, could never speak of only one religious group.

Likewise, Rokeya was an original. Opening up the history of the plight of women from all language and religious groups, Rokeya in her novel *Padmarug* made the people realize that the sufferings of women in all countries, languages and religions were the same. She also did not miss the chance of directly criticizing religion. Her views on religion published in one of her articles in 1904 said: 'Thus, you can see that these religious books are nothing more than laws made by men. You might see the opposite to whatever you hear in the laws of the male sages, in the rules composed by any female sages. However, no one can definitely state whether or not the religious books are God-sent things. If God had sent his emissaries with the intention of ruling women, then most probably they would not have remained confined to Asia only. Why did not those emissaries go to Europe? Does God belong to Asia only? Didn't he have any kingdom in America? If God exists in all countries, then why did not His emissaries spread everywhere? However, it is now no longer right to bow our heads in the name of religion and tolerate the unreasonable supremacy of men'.

Of course, there were protests against the views of Begum Rokeya. But at that time no religious community demanded from the government a punishment for Rokeya. What was not done at the beginning of the twentieth century has been done at its end. The persecution, which Rokeya did not have to stomach in a dependent nation, is confronting Taslim in an independent state. Does it mean that our society was marching backward over a century?

It is being heard that in the village and rural areas of Bangladesh, powerful religious persons are daily issuing different sorts of Islamic decrees whose overall objective is to suppress women and the poor. It is comprehensible why they are in awe of Taslima. Is it possible to accept a girl criticizing religion in such an unyielding and dauntless fashion without making any distinction between different communities? The sober and chicken hearted women should be protected from the influence of that person who says such things as 'not modesty but insolence should be the virtue of women'. The state authorities also have to bow before the same religious powers, probably not for the reason of religious fear, but for various political-economic pressures that secretly exist. [passage omitted]

A person is not a member of any one single state, he is also an inhabitant of a cultural world. The persons, whose culture is not confined to the matter of only customs and manners, feel a kind of a kinship among the inhabitants of the same cultural world. I belong to West Bengal and I have no nostalgia for Bangladesh. But still on reaching Dhaka I felt at each and every moment how

much this city is more akin to me than Madras and Bombay. Taslima also has the same feeling of kinship for Calcutta and I have noticed time and again the reflection of it in her writings. Taslima could stay in the city of Calcutta only for few days after the lifting of a long standing state restrictions. But in exchange, what did the city of her love give to her? I was struck dumbfounded to witness, in Taslima's interview on the Metro Channel of Doordarsan, a nearly uneducated type of discussion—based only on newspaper gossip. I consoled myself thinking that most probably the interviewers were not Bengalees and, thus, they did not know anything about Taslima's creative work and also thought that this was not a matter of Calcutta but Delhi. But that consolation was not possible when I saw the style of questioning to Taslima published in a Calcutta daily. Isn't it normal to question a person, who writes poems, stories and novels, questions related to literature? Although the language of the daily was English, I guess the interviewer knew Bengalee. But he might not know Bengalee culture or have a thorough acquaintance with Taslima's writings. Then why an interview? We all know about the irrationality of religious authorities all over the world. Why knowingly would we publish some misrepresentations which will push such a person toward confrontation? Shouldn't we—who consider ourselves cultural—have any sense of responsibility or kinship?

Taslima has been sentenced without committing any wrong and if the writers of this city do not protest against it, then could it be because Taslima's writings are feminist writings? They have such a great circulation—and this factor is unwelcome to the male writers?

PAKISTAN

Tribal, 'Afghan' Clashes' Background Disclosed

94AE0153A Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic
8 Jul 94 pp 21-23—

[Text] This time, Pakistan has decided to settle its affairs with the "Afghan Arabs." The bloody battles witnessed recently by the Teri valley, near Peshawar, between Pakistani tribes and "Afghan Arabs" have demonstrated to Islamabad the danger of the presence of these groups in its territories and the threat they pose to stabilizing the country with a tribal war. This is why the Pakistani Government has put the emphasis on expelling the "Afghans" and on viewing their mission as completed. The domestic press has gone as far as characterizing them as "terrorists" and has warned against their plan. What, precisely, has happened between the tribes and the "Afghan Arabs" and what is the "Islamic" plan that the latter have tried to set up in the region? AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has visited the battleground, met with the parties to the conflict, and returned with this interesting investigative report.

Official reports say that the first spark in the battles was touched off because of a dispute over water distribution.

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Pakistani Government sources assert that "Afghan Arabs" living in the area installed water taps on a water spring that had been running down a valley in the area and supplying drinking water to Pashtun tribes in that area. As a result, the water supply to the tribes was cut off.

But it seems that water was the "straw that broke the camel's back," and the pretext that contributed to touching off a situation that had been intensifying for months and to detonating major conflicts that had been burning under the ashes. The fact is that the Pashtun tribes—the Afridi tribes, to be specific—that live in the Teri valley, which is nearly 80 km from Peshawar in the direction of the Afghan borders, have not viewed with pleasure the fact that hundreds of "Afghan Arabs" have invaded their areas. Initially, the tribesmen did not object to seeing these young Arab men, who had participated in the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, take asylum in their vast mountainous territories. They permitted them to settle in the region, especially when they learned that these "Afghans" were running away from the Pakistani authorities that had been pursuing them to arrest and expel them from the country. In their dealings with tribal leaders, the "Afghans" harped on the religious note and dwelt on their history of jihad and struggle against communism and on the fact that they are wanted by their countries and that they cannot return home. The illiteracy, primitiveness, and naivete of the Pashtun tribal society have contributed to hosting these "Afghans" who have adapted so quickly that a number of them married into tribal families. Some of them have even married more than three women. Pakistani sources have estimated the number of "Afghan Arabs" and their families in the region at 370 persons who belong to Arab Palestinian, Jordanian, Egyptian, Algerian, Sudanese, and African nationalities.

But in no time, disputes erupted between the tribes and the "Afghan Arabs" who showed their other side and who started promoting the ideas of a radical religious tendency that they are trying to impose on the tribes and a political plan that they are trying to achieve throughout Pakistan. This has led not only to an uprising by Pashtun tribal leaders against the "strangers," but also to stirring the concern of the Pakistani authorities who fear that the situation could develop into a sectarian war and could arouse sectarian rancor that will reflect negatively on the domestic Pakistani situation, which encompasses numerous contradictions and elements that can torpedo the country's national peace.

Dispute Over 'Caliphate'

In fact, information collected by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI after a lengthy investigation in the region and after interviews with the parties to the conflict confirms that the recent bloody battles between "Afghan Arabs" and Pashtun tribes in Pakistan have a long story that dates back to the days following the end of the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In the

wake of the setback the Afghan mojahedin suffered in the Jalalabad (eastern Afghanistan) battles of March 1989 and after the Soviet forces had withdrawn, Kabul's communist regime was able to stand fast in the face of the mojahedin attacks until April 1992. During that period, a number of "Afghan Arabs" started to think seriously of operating outside Afghanistan. This idea gained strength when the mojahedin assumed power and when the stillongoing conflicts erupted among Afghan factions in a civil war, which has claimed to date more than 10,000 lives, wounded tens of thousands, and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Whereas some "Afghan Arabs" chose to move to new military fronts, either in their own countries or in other places, some mojahedin factions decided to launch the plan to proclaim an "Islamic caliphate" and to begin a field experiment in the region.

Toward this end, the city of Peshawar witnessed numerous meetings and consultations among a number of "Afghan Arab" factions who belong to several nationalities. At the time, a Palestinian young man called Abu-'Uthman carried the banner of this idea and preached it. He also undertook the mission of militarizing Arab youth in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Abu-'Uthman settled in Kohat, a well-known tourist area near Peshawar in Pakistan. He is in his 30s and is married to three women: the first Palestinian, the second Pakistani, and the third from Nurestan, one of the 30 provinces of Afghanistan. [as published, Murestan is not a province]

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that deliberations and consultations among "Afghan Arabs" on the proclamation of an Islamic caliphate led to a major dispute that has split the "Afghans" into two camps: the first called for declaring allegiance to Golboddin Hekmatyar, chairman of the Afghani Hezb-e-Eslami and the current prime minister, as the Moslem caliph. But the other camp objected strongly, opposing the idea and stressing that it was illegal to declare allegiance to Hekmatyar who deals with Shiite Iran and who is allied with the Shiite Hezb-e Wahdat in Afghanistan. Because of these conflicts, the plan suffered a real tremor, which has been reflected in division of the "Afghan Arabs" among the various Afghan factions, each according to his loyalties, and in their dispersal in some Pakistani cities and provinces. It seems that the older "Afghan Arabs" abandoned the caliphate idea whereas some young men, including Abu-'Uthman, worked to achieve it.

Within this context, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that the faction seeking to proclaim the caliphate rallied behind a Jordanian "Afghan Arab" called Abu-Hamam, a native of Karak. Abu-Hamam did, in fact, rush to proclaim himself a "caliph of the Muslims" and proceeded to settle in Teri, which falls within the jurisdiction of Hazm Obmesti [name as published], a province that is close to the Afghan territories where the recent battles took place. Sources of these "Afghan Arabs" have assured AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that the selection of this area has been successful for two reasons:

First, these "Afghans" have been able to exploit the simplicity and naivete of the people who are not well-versed in the principles of Islam and who are far from contact with other Muslims and civilization. Moreover, the "Afghans" have harped on the tone of opposition to the regime in Pakistan. This is why the alleged caliph and his supporters have been able to secure the protection and sponsorship of a number of tribal leaders, including Malik Nadir Khan Zaka Kheel, a leader of the Afridi tribes who has been tickled by the caliphate idea, and Haji Gul Bat Khan. These two tribal leaders who were well known for their hostility to the Islamabad regime in the 1970s had moved to settle in Kabul and to cooperate with the Afghan regime in campaigns aimed against Pakistan's security. But they later returned to Pakistan and "normalized" their relations with Islamabad.

Just weeks before war erupted between the "Afghan Arabs" and Pashtun tribes, Abu-Hamam and his factions reiterated proudly that they had 150,000 tribal fighters awaiting Abu-Hamam's command to proceed with the jihad to al-Aqsa Mosque [Jerusalem] and to fight whoever stands in their way. It seems that Abu-Hamam was right in counting 150,000 tribal fighters but he did not know that they would stand against him and fight him.

Reports assert that battles started turning against the "Afghan Arabs" when these Arabs lost their two main supporters among the tribes, namely Gul Bat Khan and Zaka Kheel, who died in a mysterious car accident on the Islamabad-Peshawar highway a few days before the latest confrontation erupted. The confrontation was preceded by tension, which resulted from the fact that the "Afghans" had spread to the tribal villages to promote their ideas through a network of preachers. This led to numerous clashes, which were followed by operations in which the "Afghans" kidnaped a number of young tribal men. The tribes responded by attacking the areas where the "Afghan Arabs" have a presence.

Slaughter or Departure

Other sources point out that the Pakistani Government, its intelligence agencies in particular, has played a role in inciting tribesmen against these "Afghans" and in warning of the dangers of their calls and ambitions, especially since Islamabad has accused the "Afghan Arabs" of kidnapping and killing a number of Pakistani intelligence men, thus giving the impression that they planned to declare a military rebellion against Islamabad in this region and to work to establish their own mini-state that is beyond the control of the Pakistani Government and that is financed by taxes levied on drug traffickers who use this region's mountain passes and who set up their secret [drug] laboratories in "their region."

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that early on, the Pashtun tribes killed Gul Bat Khan, a supporter of the "Afghan Arabs." But Khan's brother avenged his murder

when he attacked a consultative council of the tribes that had taken part in murdering his brother. Gul's brother killed six tribal leaders. At that point, battles developed into a semi-war and both sides used heavy weapons and 120-mm artillery from elevations of up to 6,000 feet. When the battles escalated, the tribes backed down on a condition to which they had agreed initially, namely to permit besieged "Afghan Arabs" to flee to Afghanistan. The union of tribal ulema met and issued a dispensation permitting the killing of these "Afghan Arabs," followed by a second dispensation nullifying the marriages of five Arab youths to 16 Pashtun women. Accordingly, the tribes, who surrounded the "Afghans" with 2,500 tribal troops from the Afridi tribal army, known locally as the Lashkar Afridi, gave the "Afghans" one of two options: either fight to the death or surrender and be punished with death, i.e., be slaughtered like sheep, as one Pakistani official has put it.

Tribal sources have told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that 11 "Afghan Arabs" were killed in the first days of fighting, most of them from Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Sudan. It has become known that Abu-'Uthman, a Palestinian official, Abu-Hisham, and Abu-'Abd-al-Rahman were among those killed. The sources added that tribal forces captured a caravan loaded with weapons and ammunitions while on its way from Afghanistan to resupply the besieged "Afghan Arabs" and help them continue their battle.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has also learned that Golboddin Hekmatyar, a fundamentalist Afghan leader, has sent his envoys to Islamabad to mediate between the "Afghan Arabs" and the tribes, even though he is preoccupied with the ongoing battles between his party and President Rabbani's party to regain the strategic positions he, Hekmatyar, had lost in Kabul. Hekmatyar's sources have told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that the envoys carry a proposal to end the fighting in return for permitting these "Afghan Arabs" to leave Pakistan for Afghanistan.

But the Pakistani Government has moved in the other direction, opposing the proposal for withdrawal of the "Afghan Arabs" to Afghanistan, only to return afterward. It has focused its efforts on demanding that these "Afghans" turn themselves in to the security authorities while promising to secure their departure to their countries or to their chosen destinations. A statement issued by the local Peshawar government says, "All efforts have been made to compel foreigners entering the country and residing in the tribal areas illegally to turn themselves in to the government so as to ensure their departure." One notices that the statement says that these "Afghan Arabs" had come from Afghanistan, whereas the truth is that they had fled from Peshawar and from other Pakistani cities at the end of the grace period, which the Pakistani Government had initially set at 31 January 1994, then March, and then 18 April 1994. A few weeks after the end of the grace period, these Arabs were subjected to search-and-arrest campaigns, which compelled many of them to head for the tribal areas, where

Pakistani Government control is weak. But informed sources have assured AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that Pakistani intelligence had been watching the "caliphate plan" from the outset and from the time when Abu-'Uthman was in Kohat, near Peshawar.

These sources do not think it unlikely that Pakistani security agencies played a significant role in touching off the crisis and the war between tribes and "Afghan Arabs" for fear that the danger of the "Afghans'" activities and calls would grow in such an extremely sensitive country like Pakistan.

Strugglers of Terrorists?

It is worth noting that Pakistani parliamentarians have expressed their apprehension over the situation in Teri and that they posed numerous questions to Defense Minister Shaban Mirani in the latest parliamentary session. The defense minister responded that the Federal Government would intervene to prevent any clash between the tribes and "Afghan Arabs."

But it seems that the latest battles constitute a significant turning point for the future of the "Afghan Arabs" in Pakistan. Observers do not find it unlikely that these battles constitute the beginning of the real end of these "Afghans" and that in the end, they have given the Islamabad Government a fundamental reason to settle its affairs and put an end to the activity, and even presence, of "Afghan Arabs" in its territories. It is the opinion of these observers that the Islamabad Government, which has not responded greatly to Arab and foreign calls urging it to deport the "Afghans" or to hand them over to their countries, has become fully convinced that these people pose a threat to Pakistan's security and stability and that it has become necessary to get rid of them now that they have turned into a serious domestic problem.

In the wake of the latest war with the tribes, the reputation of "Afghan Arabs" has suffered a severe blow among the Pakistani people who no longer view them as mujahedin but rather as an element of division and instability. The people have more doubts about them now. It has been noticed that the major Pakistani newspapers agree in expressing profound and growing concern over the bloody battles taking place in the tribal areas and that they have been asking questions about the mysterious roles performed by the "Afghan Arabs" in Pakistan and about the feasibility of their continuing to stay in the country. It is worth noting that THE MUSLIM, a daily issued in Islamabad, has published an editorial entitled "Mujahedin or Terrorists" which says in part: "Pakistan has made the right decision to expel these 'Afghan Arabs' now that their work here has ended. But instead of returning to their countries, these groups have moved to the tribal areas and set up camps and fortified positions there. This is tantamount to a flagrant challenge to and violation of orders of the government, which considers the tribal areas a part subject to its

control." It is worth noting that THE MUSLIM is a pro-Iran newspaper. Even though this paper has been eager to denounce radical fundamentalist groups that do not embrace the Iranian line, it has included in its campaign all "Afghan Arabs," including large factions that are tied to Tehran and that are financed and sponsored by Iran. This confirms, of course, the growing conflicts among the various factions of "Afghan Arabs." But what is more important, it confirms that groups and countries that have supported the "Afghan Arabs" are no longer reluctant to consider them "terrorists." As for Pakistan, it considers them undesirable. This has been confirmed to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI by official sources which have said firmly that Islamabad has decided to expel the "Afghan Arabs" who exist in the tribal areas and to pursue all others who exist in Pakistani territories "because their mission ended with the end of the jihad in Afghanistan, and they have to leave the country promptly."

Azad Kashmir Leader Explains Tension Among Mujahidin

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8 Jul 94 pp 30-31

[Interview With Sardar Abdul Qayyum, Azad Kashmir prime minister, by Muhammad al-Sa'id in Islamabad; date not given—first paragraph is AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI introduction]

[Text] Islamabad—The situation in Kashmir is deteriorating so seriously that the major powers fear it will lead to the eruption of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, the prime minister of Azad Kashmir, which is under Pakistani Government control, has assured AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that this danger does actually exist. In this interview, conducted with him in Islamabad, Khan spoke of developments of the situation in Kashmir and revealed that there is firm cooperation between Israel and India, characterized currently by the use of Israeli expertise to seal the borders the way Gaza and the West Bank have been sealed and by the endeavor to form a brigade from among the settlers in Kashmir. Khan acknowledges the presence of "Afghan Arabs" and of Muslims from various nationalities among Kashmir fighters. He has also acknowledged the presence of an Iranian role, adding that Tehran's role has declined since Iran strengthened its relations with India. Following is the text of the interview:

[Al-Sa'id] It has been noticed that conditions in Kashmir are deteriorating. What are the latest developments in the Kashmir issue and how do you evaluate the current developments?

[Qayyum] The latest developments are that the Indian authorities are planning to launch a sweeping large-scale offensive to suppress the mujahidin. [New] Delhi has reinforced its forces in Kashmir. It is evident that India is following the method of psychological and military

war to foil the Pakistani plan submitted in Geneva and to strike the mojahedin's morale. India has even tried to arouse internecine conflict and fighting but has failed in its endeavor. The mojahedin are becoming more willful and stronger.

[Al-Sa'id] Indian forces have threatened to launch air raids against Kashmiri fighters. How serious and dangerous is this threat to the fighters?

[Qayyum] This matter is serious, of course. The Indian Army has discovered that it is impossible for the current situation to continue. They are losing 40-60 billion rupees annually. They cannot withstand such an expense. This is why they are trying to adopt different methods to stem this drain and to weaken the mujahidin.

[Al-Sa'id] Now that four years have lapsed since the onset of the Kashmir uprising, what is your assessment of India's strategy?

[Qayyum] We expect India to persist in its oppressive policy, to try to liquidate the new generation, to violate honor, and to blow up homes in an attempt to deal the Kashmiri people's morale a fatal blow. India has only one of two options: either persist in the policy of violence and persecution or agree to and abide by the UN resolutions.

Civil War

[Al-Sa'id] Aren't there fears of the outbreak of internecine war among the Kashmiri people—a war that produces results similar to what has happened in Afghanistan?

[Qayyum] No, I don't think so. The fighting you talk about isn't among mujahidin factions but among those whom India has been training and arming since 1966. India has been teaching these people the Kashmiri dialect and the [language of the] mujahidin. These Hindu people have turned into Kashmiris and have fabricated clashes in order to start a civil war. But the people have been aware of their schemes and have foiled them. These people have been isolated and many of them have left Kashmir.

[Al-Sa'id] But doesn't the presence of a multiplicity of fighting factions mean the presence of the seeds of a future civil war similar to the Afghan war?

[Qayyum] It is true that there are varied organizations in Kashmir. However, there has been improvement in this regard. At one time, there were more than 30 factions and parties, whereas there are just four major parties now. Disagreement between them hasn't reached the point of internecine fighting. Moreover, no civil war will be in India's interest. We hope to unite all these factions. But this is difficult practically. All factions have never been united in the history of any people's struggle. However, I am confident that we will agree on specific programs for which all of us work.

[Al-Sa'id] Some circles have begun to talk about a third option to resolve the Kashmir crisis. What are the features of this option and what is your position on it?

[Qayyum] For us and for Pakistan, we have no option other than a UN-sponsored referendum and implementation of UN resolutions. If any other party has another option, then let this party present its option. We are prepared to discuss any proposal. The options are in India's hand, and it is the party that must present new proposals. Practically, there is nobody in the world who wants to pressure India for Kashmir's sake. We believe that if the issue is presented for discussion now, it would be a waste of time, unless India declares a position to end the occupation. Those who talk of a third option, meaning Kashmir's independence, forget that there are UN resolutions to conduct a general referendum. Thus, the matter will be up to the people and will not be determined by negotiations.

[Al-Sa'id] If India agrees to Kashmir's independence and not to its annexation to Pakistan, will you support secession from Pakistan or will you insist on joining it?

[Qayyum] Let India first agree to end its occupation of Kashmir. Then, it will have nothing to do with what the people decide, be it independence or accession to Pakistan. We will then declare our opinion clearly and frankly.

[Al-Sa'id] No part of the UN resolutions on Kashmir has been implemented. What, in your opinion, is the reason and what is the means to implement them?

[Qayyum] The reason is that the major powers have been protecting India's policy by using the veto right at the Security Council. This applied to the Soviet Union, and later to Russia, as it applies to the United States, which supplies India with technology, and even to China, which isn't currently in a position to embark on a conflict with India because of special calculations. The rest of the world doesn't wish to pressure India. Even the Islamic countries don't plan to apply such pressure because of their economic interests.

[Al-Sa'id] It has been noticed that there is growing U.S. interest in the situation in Kashmir and that there are official and unofficial voices that call for resolving the Kashmir crisis and for bringing up the issue with India. What is the reason for this sudden interest now and how do you view these efforts?

[Qayyum] The United States works to bring up the Kashmir issue in a way that serves its interests and not in a way that guarantees the Kashmiri people's freedom. Washington wants to use the Kashmir card to pressure India and Pakistan. The independent Kashmir plan is, if accomplished, aimed against China. While we welcome any efforts for a fair solution in Kashmir, we realize that the United States will not fight our battle on our behalf.

Israeli Expertise

[Al-Sa'id] It was previously announced that Kashmiri fighters killed soldiers from Israeli commando units. Is

there really an Israeli presence in Kashmir? What are its dimensions and what are the dimensions of the Israeli-Indian cooperation in the region?

[Qayyum] There is large-scale cooperation between the Mosad and the Indian intelligence, and we are talking of firm cooperation against us specifically. Indian authorities are in constant contact with Israel in this regard. The Indians have enlisted Israeli expertise to seal the borders the way the West Bank and Gaza have been sealed. They are making efforts now to form a brigade in Kashmir similar to the settlers' brigade. Israel also helps India implement the method of inciting conflicts and division among various sectors of the Kashmiri people.

[Qayyum] Many fear that the Kashmir crisis will lead to a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. It is well known that such a war nearly erupted in 1990. What is your opinion?

[Qayyum] The danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war has actually existed, and it continues to exist. The two countries have their nuclear capability. Pakistan says that it possesses an atomic bomb and India manufactures nuclear weapons for the sake of Kashmir solely. India is trying to produce a hydrogen bomb now. What will they do with these bombs? Anyway, if war erupts, it will be a nuclear war.

[Al-Sa'id] Is the Kashmir issue influenced by the domestic political struggle between the government and the opposition in Pakistan?

[Qayyum] Yes, the struggle has a psychological and political impact. There is no doubt that political stability in Pakistan reinforces support for the Kashmiri people.

[Al-Sa'id] Your relations with the Federal Government and with the People's Party in Kashmir are worsening day after day. Couldn't this lead to what the Federal Government has called toppling the Kashmir government and replacing it by a loyal government?

[Qayyum] Our relations with the Federal Government aren't worsening. They are frozen and they aren't improving. The People's Party has no base in Azad Kashmir. It exists here because the Federal Government in Islamabad belongs to and supports this party. I don't think that Islamabad will resort to destabilizing Kashmir's government.

[Al-Sa'id] There are reports about the presence of "Afghan Arabs" and foreign elements that fight among your ranks?

[Qayyum] Yes, there are a number of elements from various nationalities who participate in the jihad.

[Al-Sa'id] Do you support their participation or do you try to block them?

[Qayyum] We will not block them. Why should we stop them? I haven't asked them to come and I don't take part

in introducing them into the occupied Kashmir. Why am I asked to prevent them from engaging in jihad? We have relations with the Afghan parties but these relations haven't reached the military level. We don't receive any aid from them because such aid is impossible under the canopy of the conditions in Afghanistan. If they offer any aid, we will not reject it. The borders are controlled by Indian forces exceeding 600,000 in number. So why don't these forces stop them from entering?

[Al-Sa'id] There are reports about the presence of mujahidin training camps in Azad Kashmir. Doesn't this constitute direct aid on your part as an official authority?

[Qayyum] We haven't set up any training camps in Azad Kashmir. However, there are nearly 200,000 retired military men in Kashmir, and they train their families and their relatives in their homes. This doesn't constitute a violation of any law.

Iran Supports India

[Al-Sa'id] What is your evaluation of the Iran's role in Kashmir?

[Qayyum] In the beginning, the Iranians supported and encouraged us. But they changed their position later. It seems that India has succeeded in developing relations with the Iranians and has promised them economic aid. India has sold Iran a nuclear reactor and Iran has agreed to extend a gas pipeline to India via Pakistan. Iranians believe that establishing good relations with India alleviates U.S. pressures on Iran. New Delhi plays a role in supporting Iran at the propaganda and political levels. We shouldn't forget that the U.S. position supports India.

[Al-Sa'id] During the latest meeting in Geneva, why did Pakistan back down on the demand that the meeting issue a resolution condemning India's violation of human rights in Kashmir?

[Qayyum] Simply, because there wasn't a single country prepared to support the Pakistani draft resolution. Even China and Iran have their own calculations. By not voting, Beijing sought to maintain its trade status with the United States as a most favored nation. As for Iran, it didn't because of its growing relations with India.

[Al-Sa'id] British citizens were kidnapped recently by Kashmiri fighters. Do you support such a method?

[Qayyum] We are opposed to kidnapping activities and we don't support the kidnapping of foreigners in Kashmir. Most of the movements that struggle for freedom and for eliminating Indian colonialism have an Islamic tendency and they couldn't resort to such acts.

We could have kidnapped foreigners but we didn't. We asked them to leave Kashmir because it is a war arena. We contacted the kidnappers and asked them to release the kidnapped, and this was done afterward.

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